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Absurdity and Excessively Delayed 
Executions 
Russell L. Christopher* 
While capital punishment per se is constitutionally permissible, is 
“capital punishment plus” unconstitutional? Death row prisoners claim 
that capital punishment plus as much as thirty years or more of post-
sentence, pre-execution death row incarceration is disproportionate and 
excessive, constituting cruel and unusual punishment. While Justice Breyer 
and former Justice Stevens defend the claim as meritorious, Justice 
Thomas derides it as a mockery of justice and nearly every court denies 
the claim. In upholding the constitutionality of such excessively delayed 
executions, courts principally rely on a trio of arguments. Utilizing a 
reductio ad absurdum method of argument, this Article demonstrates that 
the trio would absurdly deny numerous, long-standing, fundamental rights 
emanating from the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 
expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court. By absurdly denying clearly 
existing constitutional rights, the trio is unsound. Demonstrating that the 
trio is unsound clears the path for courts to recognize that excessively 
delayed executions violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On America’s death row, delays between sentence and execution are 
now approaching forty years.1 In what are known as “Lackey claims,” 
after Clarence Lackey’s 1995 petition to the Supreme Court for a writ 
of certiorari, death row prisoners argue that execution following 
decades of death row incarceration is disproportionate punishment 
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment for two reasons.2 As Brent Newton, counsel for 
Lackey and architect of the Lackey claim explained, “first . . . 
execution after . . . [incarceration] under the extreme conditions of 
death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact more 
punishment than . . . the Eighth Amendment [allows]; and second, . . . 
neither of the state’s primary interests . . . — retribution and 
deterrence — would be meaningfully served . . . after such a lengthy 
delay . . . .”3 Despite Justice Stephen Breyer and former Justice John 
Paul Stevens championing Lackey claims,4 for nearly twenty years — 
until 2014 — no court had recognized them.5 
 
 1 See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). The prisoner, aka Thomas Knight, received his death 
sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). Therefore, he had been incarcerated on death row for thirty-
nine years. Far from being an isolated instance, over 200 prisoners have been on death 
row for thirty to forty years. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2012 — STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.15 (rev. 2014) (stating that 33 current 
death row prisoners were placed there from 1974–1979, 60 from 1980–1982, and 121 
from 1983–1985). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
Although the Supreme Court denied Lackey’s petition, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 
1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari), the similar claims brought by 
numerous other death row prisoners have become known as “Lackey claims.” E.g., 
Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002) (“This claim [of substantially delayed 
execution] has become known as a Lackey claim.”); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of 
Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 699, 762 (2002) (“[T]he claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly 
known as a ‘Lackey claim.’”).  
 3 Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 54-55 (2012) [hereinafter Slow Wheels].  
 4 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of 
Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 681 (2010) (“Over the past 
fifteen years, Justices Stevens and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to 
address the issue, with Justice Breyer characterizing the claim as ‘serious’ (quoting 
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (dissenting from denial of certiorari)) 
and ‘particularly strong,’ (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (dissenting from denial of 
certiorari)), and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that prolonged death row 
incarceration is ‘unacceptably cruel.’” (quoting Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 
1116 (2009) (respecting denial of certiorari))). For Justice Breyer’s most recent 
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Repeatedly denying Lackey claims, courts have principally relied on 
three arguments. First, death row prisoners choose to pursue appellate 
and collateral review of their sentence.6 As chosen by prisoners, a 
consequence of that choice — delay between sentence and execution — 
is attributable to the prisoners, not the State.7 “It makes ‘a mockery of 
our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer, who [chooses 
appellate and collateral review that causes] . . . the almost-indefinite 
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite 
postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’”8 Second, 
appellate and collateral review of capital sentences is necessary to 
ensure their accuracy and fairness.9 A consequence of what is necessary 
to ensure accuracy and fairness — delay between sentence and 
execution — must be constitutionally permissible.10 “[D]eath row 
delays [are constitutional] because delay results from the ‘desire of our 
courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that 
might save someone’s life.’”11 Third, appellate and collateral review of 
capital sentences is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.12 “It 
 
dissent from a denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim, see Muhammad, 134 S. Ct. at 894.  
 5 See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *38 n.12 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [Lackey claims] 
. . . .” (citations omitted)). In July 2014, Jones v. Chappell became the first (post-
Lackey) case to recognize a Lackey claim. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 
1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (vacating defendant’s death sentence because lengthy delays 
between sentencing and execution have “resulted in a system that serves no 
penological purpose” and is “unconstitutional”); Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the 
Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 
987, 998 (2014) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy] (reporting that “no lower court has 
granted relief on a Lackey claim” but then noting in a Post-Script the announcement 
of Jones’ recognition of a Lackey claim).  
 6 See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) (emphasizing that the “petitioner chose to challenge 
his death sentence”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 n.21 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]o the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in the hope of obtaining relief, 
that is a choice they make for themselves.”).  
 7 See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (“The delay of which [the prisoner] now complains is a direct 
consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .”).  
 8 Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (quoting Turner, 58 F.3d at 933).  
 9 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (“[T]he cause for 
the delay . . . [was that the prisoner] ‘availed himself of procedures our law provides 
to ensure that executions are carried out only in appropriate circumstances.’” (quoting 
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67)). 
 10 See Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
 11 Id. (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998)).  
 12 See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the state’s 
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would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays caused by 
satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.”13 
These three arguments have been extraordinarily influential in 
denying Lackey claims. Nearly every court addressing Lackey claims 
on the merits has invoked at least one, if not all three.14 Most of the 
federal circuit courts have invoked all three and Supreme Court 
Justice Clarence Thomas endorses at least two of them.15 These 
arguments have apparently been sufficiently persuasive to the full 
Court; it steadfastly has declined to accept review of Lackey claims.16 
Until 2014, no court had disagreed with them.17 
This Article demonstrates, however, that these three influential 
arguments entail absurd consequences — the denial of fundamental, 
long-standing constitutional rights. That is, not only do they deny a 
claimed Eighth Amendment right against excessively delayed 
execution, but they also deny constitutional rights expressly 
guaranteed by the Supreme Court. Demonstrating that this trio of 
arguments leads to absurd or false conclusions denying clearly existing 
constitutional rights demonstrates that the trio is unsound.18 
Eliminating the support of the trio eliminates the primary obstacle to 
 
“interest in insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with 
constitutionally mandated safeguards”).  
 13 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999); accord McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 
1467 (“We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment 
themselves violate it.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Jane Marriott, Walking the Eighth Amendment Tightrope: ‘Time Served’ in 
the United States Supreme Court, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL 
INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 159, 179 (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) (“[There are] three forms 
of reasoning that inevitably le[a]d to the [Lackey] claim being rejected. First . . . that 
courts may find compelling reasons for the delay. Second, . . . delays caused by way of 
satisfying the demands of the Eighth Amendment simply cannot violate it. Third, . . . 
the delay was not attributable to the state . . . .”); see also infra notes 123, 151, 166. 
 15 See infra Part I.C.1.b and note 232.  
 16 See, e.g., Thompson, 517 F.3d at 1284 (noting “the total absence of Supreme 
Court precedent”). For the most recent denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim triggering 
a response by a Justice, see Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 17 See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting two 
of these arguments as “simply incorrect” on empirical grounds); see also infra Part I.C.  
 18 An argument is unsound if either its form of reasoning is invalid or if it contains 
a false premise. See Albert E. Blumberg, Modern Logic, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 12, 13 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (explaining the “term ‘sound,’ to refer to 
arguments that both are valid and contain true premises”); Christopher Kirwan, 
Argument, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY 49, 49 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 
2005) (noting that ‘sound’ refers to “valid arguments with true premises”).  
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courts recognizing that execution following decades of death row 
incarceration is unconstitutional. 
Utilizing a reductio ad absurdum method of argument,19 this Article 
assumes the soundness of the trio in order to apply the trio to a variety 
of constitutional rights and assess the consequences. If that application 
leads to absurd or false conclusions, then the trio is unsound. As an 
example, to see how the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions, 
suppose an indigent defendant exercises her Sixth Amendment right 
to the appointment of counsel.20 Following conviction, she appeals 
claiming that her appointed counsel was ineffective and her Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.21 
Further suppose that an appellate court denies her claim based on the 
following application of the trio to this Sixth Amendment context. 
First, the defendant chose to have appointed counsel.22 As chosen by 
the defendant, a consequence of that choice — ineffectiveness of 
counsel — is attributable to the defendant, not the State.23 It makes a 
mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to request the 
appointment of counsel at State expense and, after that counsel is 
furnished, then to complain that her counsel’s ineffectiveness renders 
her conviction unconstitutional.24 Second, the appointment of counsel 
for indigents is necessary for accuracy and fairness.25 A consequence of 
what is necessary for accuracy and fairness — ineffectiveness of 
counsel — must be constitutionally permissible.26 The appointment of 
 
 19 “The reductio ad absurdum is a valid argument form which is widely used and 
highly effective.” WESLEY C. SALMON, LOGIC 30 (1963). Under this method, to 
demonstrate that an argument is unsound, its truth is assumed. If that assumption 
leads to false or absurd consequences, then the assumption may be false and the 
argument may be rejected. See, e.g., JULIAN BAGGINI & PETER S. FOSL, THE PHILOSOPHER’S 
TOOLKIT: A COMPENDIUM OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS 117 (2003) 
(“[T]he philosopher starts with premises held by those whose position they 
undermine . . . follow[ing] through the logic of the premises to their absurd 
conclusion . . . hop[ing] to show that, if the premises lead to absurd consequences, the 
premises must be wrong.”); see also infra note 182. 
 20 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel for indigents to state court defendants via the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a matter of fundamental fairness essential to a fair trial). 
 21 See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
 22 Compare statement in text, with supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 23 Compare statement in text, with supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 24 Compare statement in text, with supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 25 Compare statement in text, with supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 26 Compare statement in text, with supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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counsel cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because 
appointment of counsel stems from the desire of our courts, state and 
federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance that might prevent a 
wrongful conviction.27 Third, the appointment of counsel for indigents 
(charged with a felony) is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.28 
It would be a mockery of justice for ineffectiveness of counsel caused 
by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate it.29 Not only does the 
trio deny an indigent with appointed counsel a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel, but also granting such a right would be 
a mockery of justice. 
Of course, something is terribly wrong. The trio did not deny the 
defendant’s ineffectiveness claim because the defendant did, in fact, 
receive effective counsel. Nor did the trio deny the claim because the 
defendant failed to meet her evidentiary burden or failed to establish 
prejudice. Rather, the trio denied her claim by establishing that the 
defendant lacks a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel in principle. Moreover, the trio would establish that no 
defendant enjoys both the right to appointed counsel and the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Something is terribly wrong because, of 
course, all defendants exercising the right to counsel, “whether 
retained or appointed,” do have a Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.30 Beginning with Powell v. Alabama31 in 
1932, the Supreme Court has long recognized and repeatedly held that 
the Sixth Amendment “‘right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.’”32 Because the trio absurdly denies a clearly 
existing, long-standing constitutional right expressly guaranteed by 
the Supreme Court, the trio is unsound. 
Perhaps, one might object, the delayed execution and right to 
counsel contexts are disanalogous. While ineffectiveness of counsel is 
only a possible consequence of a defendant exercising the right to 
counsel, delay between sentencing and execution is a necessary 
consequence of a death row prisoner seeking post-conviction review. 
As will be discussed more expansively below,33 the objection is 
 
 27 Compare statement in text, with supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 28 Compare statement in text, with supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 29 Compare statement in text, with supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 30 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 31 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (“[Because counsel was ineffective,] we hold that 
defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.”).  
 32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970)).  
 33 See infra Part II.G.3.  
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unpersuasive. While some delay may be a necessary consequence of 
post-conviction review, the entirety of, for example, a thirty-year delay 
stemming from multiple “constitutionally defective sentencing 
proceedings” is unnecessary and avoidable.34 Furthermore, because 
the nationwide average period of delay is less than sixteen years, the 
average delays of twenty-five years in California and Florida are clearly 
unnecessary and avoidable.35 As a result, just as ineffectiveness of 
counsel is only a possible consequence of a defendant’s choice to 
exercise the right to counsel, so also particularly lengthy or excessive 
delay is only a possible consequence of a prisoner’s choice to pursue 
post-conviction review. On that basis, the two contexts are analogous. 
One might still object that there is something special about the Sixth 
Amendment context in which the trio leads to an absurd or false 
conclusion. But this Article will demonstrate that the trio absurdly 
denies six other clearly existing constitutional rights stemming from 
the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process and 
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That the trio 
absurdly denies seven clearly existing, long-standing, fundamental 
constitutional rights established by the Supreme Court and stemming 
from three different constitutional Amendments suggests that the 
problem with the trio lies not in their application to that one context 
and one right but in the trio itself. 
We now have more than a hint as to why the trio has been so 
influential in denying Lackey claims. Because the trio would deny 
numerous, clearly existing constitutional rights guaranteed by the 
Supreme Court, the trio establishes too high a bar for an actual or 
claimed constitutional right to meet. If even long-standing, 
fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court 
cannot meet this too-high standard, a Lackey claim’s failure to meet 
this too-high standard is no longer evidence that it fails to warrant 
constitutional protection. 
One might still object that the trio cannot fairly be applied to 
constitutional rights outside the Eighth Amendment. As will be 
discussed more fully below,36 the objection is unpersuasive for several 
reasons. First, not only is there little about the three arguments 
relevant only to the Eighth Amendment, there is little about them 
relevant to the Eighth Amendment at all. Second, the three arguments 
 
 34 Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).  
 35 See infra notes 66–68.  
 36 See infra Part II.G for a more comprehensive response to this possible objection, 
as well as responses to other anticipated objections.  
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themselves are framed as broad propositions meant to capture our 
sense of intuition and reason about constitutional rights. They can 
fairly be applied just as broadly as they are framed. Third, as will be 
demonstrated, the arguments themselves derive from Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right analysis. Because the three arguments 
themselves derive from arguments outside the Eighth Amendment 
context, they may fairly be applied outside the Eighth Amendment 
context. 
In undertaking the first comprehensive critical examination of the 
three principal arguments courts use to deny Lackey claims, this 
Article does not make an affirmative case for why Lackey claims 
should prevail. The affirmative case has already been extensively 
advanced.37 But what is largely missing in the debate is each side 
specifically addressing each other’s arguments.38 Moreover, each side 
is talking past each other. Lackey claimants are making substantive 
Eighth Amendment arguments about punishment;39 courts are largely 
dismissing it as a procedural due process claim involving nothing more 
than delay.40 Attempting to bridge this conceptual divide and redress 
this imbalance in the debate, this Article directly engages with the 
principal arguments of courts rejecting Lackey claims. In order to find 
common ground, it assumes arguendo that the arguments are sound in 
order to assess their consequences. The consequences of these 
arguments, however, are the absurd denial of seven clearly existing, 
long-standing constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court. 
Because the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions — the non-
existence of clearly existing constitutional rights — the trio itself is 
unsound. 
The Article unfolds in the following Parts. After Part I furnishes an 
overview of capital punishment and excessively delayed executions, 
Part II demonstrates that the trio is unsound because the trio absurdly 
denies the following clearly existing constitutional rights established 
 
 37 For the most recent examples, see Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is 
Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421, 452-79 (2014) (arguing that execution 
following prolonged death row incarceration violates retributivism); Michael Johnson, 
Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and Extended Stays on 
Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 103-12 (2014) (contending that extended death 
row incarceration violates double jeopardy). For a collection of the literature, see 
Newton, Justice Kennedy, supra note 5, at 988 n.34. For the arguments of Justices 
Breyer and Stevens, see cases cited infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.  
 38 For criticisms that courts denying Lackey claims have not squarely addressed 
the claims, see infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.  
 39 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 40 See infra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.  
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by the Supreme Court: (i) Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool 
representative of the community, (ii) Sixth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rights to an impartial 
jury, (iii) Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause right 
against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection, 
(iv) Fifth Amendment right to a no-adverse-inference jury instruction 
regarding the defendant’s choice not to testify, (v) Fifth Amendment 
right against negative comments to the jury regarding the defendant’s 
choice not to testify, and (vi) the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial. Finally, Part II presents and counters four possible objections to 
this Part’s claim that the trio is unsound. 
While Part II demonstrates that the three arguments are unsound, 
Part III explains why these three intuitively appealing arguments are 
unsound. These explanations provide additional bases, independent 
from Part II, for rejecting the trio. The flaw in the first argument — a 
defendant/prisoner is responsible for the consequences of the 
constitutional rights she chooses to exercise — is the false assumption 
that the defendant/prisoner is ultimately responsible for the type of 
trial the State conducts and the type of punishment the State imposes. 
The flaw in the second and third arguments — the consequences of 
what is necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfying the 
Constitution cannot violate it — is the false assumption that what is 
necessary to satisfy the Constitution is also sufficient. The mere 
satisfaction of one right necessary to satisfy the Constitution will not 
be sufficient to satisfy all of a defendant’s/prisoner’s multiple 
constitutional rights. And in some cases, the consequences of 
satisfying one right — necessary to satisfy the Constitution — will 
violate another right thereby precluding the satisfaction of all of the 
rights sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. By demonstrating that the 
three principal arguments used by courts to deny Lackey claims are 
unsound, this Article clears the path for courts to recognize that 
execution following as much as thirty years or more of death row 
incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
I. OVERVIEW OF EXCESSIVELY DELAYED EXECUTIONS 
After sketching a brief explanation of the constitutionality of capital 
punishment in general, Part I charts the ever-increasing delays 
between sentencing and execution, as well as their causes. Next, it 
canvasses the early, pre-Lackey cases addressing excessively delayed 
executions before examining Lackey itself and the ensuing debate on 
the Court between Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Thomas. After 
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surveying the chilly reception Lackey claims have received in the 
lower courts over the last twenty years, this Part highlights two very 
recent developments possibly portending a brighter future for the 
claim. Finally, Part I more expansively presents, and notes the 
criticisms of, the trio. 
A. Constitutionality of Capital Punishment 
In order to better understand the Lackey claim, a brief account of 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the constitutionality of capital 
punishment may be helpful. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court 
found the death penalty unconstitutional as applied principally 
because its imposition was arbitrary and capricious.41 “These death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual.”42 In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the 
Court upheld capital punishment as per se constitutional under a two-
part test.43 First, capital punishment must be acceptable not only from 
the perspective of the Eighth Amendment’s adoption in 1791, but also 
to contemporary society — acceptable under “‘the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”44 Second, 
capital punishment “must accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is 
the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”45 This 
principle of human dignity bars both “barbarous” methods of 
execution46 that are “cruelly inhumane”47 and excessive 
punishments.48 There are two types of excessive punishments — 
unnecessary and disproportionate.49 An unnecessary punishment fails 
to further legitimate penological goals — principally, retribution and 
deterrence.50 A disproportionate punishment fails to sufficiently 
 
 41 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) 
(“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [capital 
punishment] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).  
 42 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 43 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-87 (1976).  
 44 Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
 45 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).  
 46 Id. at 170-71.  
 47 Id. at 175.  
 48 See id. at 173-75 (explaining that punishment comporting with human dignity 
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive’”).  
 49 Id. at 173.  
 50 Id. at 183 (noting that unnecessary punishment constitutes “the gratuitous 
infliction of suffering”).  
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correlate with the severity of the offense51 or the culpability of the 
offender.52 Regarding the severity of the offense, capital punishment is 
proportionate to at least some types of murder,53 but is 
disproportionate to the offense of rape.54 With respect to the 
culpability of the offender, capital punishment is proportionate for at 
least some adults, but is disproportionate for juveniles.55 The original 
and primary conception of the Lackey claim maintains that execution 
following lengthy death row incarceration violates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as 
both unnecessary and disproportionate punishment.56 Another 
conception of the claim argues that the lengthy death row 
incarceration alone is unconstitutional as cruelly inhumane.57 
B. Delay Between Sentence and Execution 
Over time, the temporal intervals between capital sentencing and 
execution and the duration of tenures on death row have steadily 
risen. In the eighteenth-century William Blackstone reported that “in 
England, it is enacted by statute that the judge, before whom a 
murderer is convicted, shall in passing sentence, direct him to be 
executed on the next day but one.”58 Terming the two days a “short 
but awful interval,”59 Blackstone explained that the interval must be 
 
 51 Id. at 173 (assessing proportionality between the punishment and “the severity 
of the crime”).  
 52 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that capital 
punishment is disproportionate for the mentally retarded because of their lesser 
culpability).  
 53 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (holding that death penalty is not 
disproportionate to defendant’s murder conviction).  
 54 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that capital 
punishment is disproportionate to the crime of rape).  
 55 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that capital 
punishment is disproportionate for juveniles).  
 56 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text; see also Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 
1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (noting two different types of 
Lackey claims).  
 57 See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari) (“[A]wait[ing] execution, petitioner has endured 
especially severe conditions of confinement, spending up to 23 hours per day in 
isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell. Two death warrants [were] . . . stayed only shortly 
before [his] . . . scheduled . . . [execution]. The dehumanizing effects of such 
treatment are undeniable.”). 
 58 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *202 (internal citation omitted). That is, 
execution must occur two days after the sentence.  
 59 Id.  
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brief because “it is of great importance, that the punishment should 
follow the crime as early as possible” in order to further the 
penological goals of punishment.60 In colonial-era America, the typical 
interval between sentencing and execution ranged from one to several 
weeks.61 More recently, the nationwide average period of delay 
jumped from two years in 1968,62 to six years in 1988,63 to ten years in 
1998,64 to eleven years in 2008,65 and to nearly sixteen years in 2012.66 
Currently, in California and Florida, the two leading death penalty 
states (by number of persons on death row),67 the average delay is 
twenty-five years.68 Nationwide, over 200 persons have been on death 
row from thirty to forty years.69 These increasing “delays have 
multiple causes.”70 Some blame the complex and lengthy appellate and 
collateral review process71 and the intentional delay of prisoners.72 
 
 60 Id. at *397 (“[T]he prospect of gratification . . . [from] commit[ting] the crime, 
should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves 
only to separate these ideas; and then the execution itself affects the minds of the 
spectators rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of 
transgression.”).  
 61 E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002).  
 62 See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (noting 
that the national median period of death row incarceration in 1968 was 33.3 months), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recognized in 
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009).  
 63 SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 18 tbl.15 (California: 712, Florida: 403).  
 68 In California, delays between sentencing and execution “exceed[] 25 years on 
average.” Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014). According to 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, “[t]he last ten people Florida has executed have spent an 
average of 24.9 years on death row.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hall v. Florida, 
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882_6kh7.pdf. 
 69 SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15 (citing 121 current death row prisoners placed 
there from 1983–1985, 60 from 1980–1982, and 33 from 1974–1979).  
 70 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial 
of certiorari).  
 71 See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957-58 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court and the lower federal courts have 
converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of the death penalty . . . into 
arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described in Charles Dickens’ 
‘Bleak House.’”). 
 72 See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (referring to prisoners’ “interminable efforts of delay and systemic 
abuse”).  
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Others blame states’ constitutionally defective procedures73 and a 
dysfunctional system overburdened due to insufficient resources.74 
Regardless of their cause, these increasing delays have transformed a 
death sentence from capital punishment per se into capital 
punishment plus or “decades-plus-death.”75 What was once an 
execution preceded by a de minimis period of administrative detention 
has now become “two separate punishments: lengthy incarceration 
under very severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in many 
states), followed by an execution.”76 For some capital offenders, the 
death penalty has become the equivalent of incarceral punishment in 
the form of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus 
capital punishment. 
In the pre-Lackey era, involving comparatively shorter delays, courts 
were comparatively more receptive to prisoners’ claims. Perhaps the 
first (and only) Supreme Court decision addressing the 
constitutionality of execution delay is In re Medley77 in 1890. 
Regarding a delay of only four weeks, the Court stated, in dicta, that 
“one of the most horrible feelings to which [the death row prisoner] 
can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty . . . . [The] 
immense mental anxiety amount[ed] to a great increase of the 
offender’s punishment.”78 No court squarely addressed the issue again 
until 1960 in Chessman v. Dickson.79 Noting that any threshold for 
when excessive delay might become unconstitutional would be 
“arbitrary,” the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a 
twelve-year delay.80 In subsequently superseded decisions, both the 
 
 73 See, e.g., Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“[M]uch of the delay at issue seems due to constitutionally 
defective sentencing proceedings.”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (characterizing delays as stemming 
primarily from states’ “constitutionally defective death penalty procedures”).  
 74 See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he 
dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty system has resulted, and 
will continue to result, in an inordinate and unpredictable period of delay 
preceding . . . execution[s].”); id. at 1056-57 (noting “the State’s underfunding of its 
death penalty system to be a key source of the problem”).  
 75 Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death Row Should Be Deemed 
Too Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1124 (2012).  
 76 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? 
Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 
30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 230-31 (2012).  
 77 134 U.S. 160 (1890).  
 78 Id. at 172.  
 79 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960).  
 80 Id. at 607.  
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California Supreme Court in 1972 and the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 1980 ruled capital punishment as unconstitutionally 
cruel based, in part, on lengthy delays between sentencing and 
execution.81 Arguing that delays frustrate the penological goals of 
punishment, in 1981 Justice Rehnquist urged that executions be 
expedited to preserve “the integrity of the entire criminal justice 
system.”82 In 1986, a federal district court found a twelve-year delay, 
for which the prisoner was deemed responsible, constitutional.83 In 
two cases that perhaps influenced Justices Breyer and Stevens, the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1989 and the British Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in 1993 ruled that executions 
following lengthy terms of death row incarceration violate 
prohibitions against “inhuman and degrading” punishment or 
treatment.84 The latter court established the threshold of five years of 
death row confinement as being presumptively unconstitutional.85 
The modern era of the debate over excessively delayed executions 
began with Lackey v. Texas in 1995.86 Clarence Lackey’s petition for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court claimed that execution following 
seventeen years of death row incarceration violated the Eighth 
 
 81 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (“The cruelty of 
capital punishment [also] lies . . . in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy 
imprisonment prior to execution . . . .”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009); 
Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) 
(“[M]ental pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, 
for the prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long 
wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death.” (quoting 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring))), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art. CXVI, as recognized in 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117-18 (Mass. 1984).  
 82 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).  
 83 Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (“The delay in the 
execution was prompted by [the prisoner].”).  
 84 Pratt v. Att’y Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 35 (appeal taken from 
Jam.) (holding that execution after fourteen years on death row was unconstitutional 
“inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment”); Soering v. United Kingdom, 
11 Eur. Ct. H.R.439, 472, 475-78 (1989) (ruling that an extraditee’s potential six to 
eight year term of death row incarceration if extradited to Virginia would constitute 
“torture or . . . inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). For their possible 
influence on Justices Breyer and Stevens, see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 
(1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
 85 Pratt, 2 A.C. at 35 (finding a five-year delay as “strong grounds” for a violation).  
 86 514 U.S. at 1045.  
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Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.87 
Though the full Court denied review, Justice Stevens commented that 
Lackey’s claim was “not without foundation.”88 Neither of the grounds 
justifying the constitutionality of capital punishment “arguabl[y] . . . 
retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a 
sentence of death.”89 First, “[s]uch a delay, if it ever occurred, 
certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the 
Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim.”90 Second, 
execution furthers neither of the penological goals of capital 
punishment — retribution and deterrence — after such lengthy 
delay.91 Justice Stevens also noted that English jurists and foreign 
courts had found similar claims “persuasive.”92 Justice Breyer simply 
noted his agreement “that the issue is an important undecided one.”93 
Though Justice Stevens found Lackey’s claim sufficient to warrant 
review by the full Court,94 he invited the lower courts “to ‘serve as 
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is 
addressed by this Court.’”95 Encouraged by Justices Breyer and 
Stevens, numerous death row prisoners subsequently filed Lackey 
claims that the lower courts repeatedly rejected and the full Court 
declined to review. Respecting the denial of these certiorari petitions, a 
lively debate arose between Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Thomas. 
Justice Breyer wrote dissenting memorandums to the denial of 
certiorari or denial of stay of execution in eight cases96 and agreed 
with or joined Justice Stevens in two further cases.97 Justice Stevens 
 
 87 Id. at 1045.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 See id. (“[A]fter such an extended time, the acceptable state interest in 
retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted.”); 
id. at 1046 (“[T]he additional deterrent effect from an actual execution now, on the 
one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row followed by the prisoner’s continued 
incarceration for life, on the other, seems minimal.”).  
 92 Id. at 1047.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 1045.  
 95 Id. at 1047 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, 
J., respecting denial of certiorari)).  
 96 See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014); Valle v. Florida, 132 S. 
Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1119 (2009); Smith v. Arizona, 
552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1140 (2006); Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999); 
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998). 
 97 Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.  
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found merit in the prisoners’ claims in three cases98 and emphasized 
that denial of certiorari “does not constitute a ruling on the merits” in 
two other cases.99 Justices Breyer and Stevens agreed that excessively 
delayed executions violate the Eighth Amendment because the “the 
penological justifications for the death penalty diminish as the delay 
lengthens.”100 The remedy is barring execution after such delays.101 
Concurring in the denial of certiorari in four cases, Justice Thomas102 
found delays constitutional because they stemmed from efforts, both 
by courts to ensure that prisoners receive due process,103 and by 
prisoners to exploit these procedural requirements to manufacture 
delay.104 As “mak[ing] ‘a mockery of our system of justice,’”105 Justice 
Thomas noted that Lackey claims require no other remedy than 
reminding prisoners that they are free to craft their own remedy by 
simply “submitting to . . . execution.”106 Assessing the lower courts’ 
response to Justice Stevens’ invitation that they serve as laboratories 
for further study of Lackey claims, Justice Thomas concluded: “These 
courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless. I submit that 
the Court should consider the experiment concluded.”107 Justice 
Breyer disagreed, replying that most courts have avoided the merits of 
Lackey claims and denied them instead on procedural grounds.108 
Until recently, Justice Thomas’ view had prevailed. From 1995 
through 2013, no American court had recognized a Lackey claim. 
Moreover, the last American court to find execution following lengthy 
delay to be unconstitutional was in 1980.109 While the next section 
will present the three principal arguments, Justice Thomas and courts 
 
 98 See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1114; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.  
 99 Foster, 537 U.S. at 990; Knight, 528 U.S. at 990.  
 100 Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1069.  
 101 E.g., id. (“[A] successful Lackey claim would have the effect of rendering invalid 
a particular death sentence . . . .”). 
 102 Id. at 1070; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1116; Foster, 537 U.S. at 990; Knight, 528 
U.S. at 990. 
 103 See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 991 (“[T]he delay in carrying out the prisoner’s 
execution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (referring to a prisoner’s “litigation 
strategy, which delays his execution”). 
 105 Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).  
 106 Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (“Petitioner could long ago have ended [the delay] . . . 
by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: 
execution.”).  
 107 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992-93 (citations omitted).  
 108 See id. at 998-99 (dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 109 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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denying Lackey claims have employed several other arguments as well. 
First, while international precedent supports Lackey claims, such 
precedent is neither binding nor persuasive.110 Second, there simply is 
no American precedent.111 Third, recognizing a Lackey claim would 
only exacerbate the delay.112 Fourth, alternatively, recognizing Lackey 
claims would promote “speed rather than accuracy.”113 And fifth, “the 
delay in carrying out death sentences has been of benefit to death row 
inmates, allowing [them] to extend their lives.”114 
But two recent developments indicate that Justice Thomas’ 
suggested closing of the Lackey claim experiment may have been 
premature. First, Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the crucial “‘swing 
vote’” in high-profile cases that split an ideologically divided court,115 
may have signaled his endorsement of the Lackey claim.116 In oral 
argument of Hall v. Florida, in March 2014, Justice Kennedy 
repeatedly asked Florida’s counsel whether average delays of twenty-
five years were “‘consistent with the purposes of the death penalty.’”117 
 
 110 See, e.g., Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 & n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari) (“[T]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose 
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”); Booker v. McNeil, No. 
1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40-41 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying 
prisoner’s claim that “binding norms of international law” prohibit his execution after 
twenty-nine years on death row).  
 111 See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (denying prisoner’s Lackey claim “given the total absence of Supreme Court 
precedent”); Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n.231 (Utah 2010) (“The 
courts . . . have uniformly rejected Lackey claims.”).  
 112 See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(contending that recognizing a Lackey claim would “prolong collateral review by 
giving virtually every capital prisoner yet another ground on which to challenge and 
delay his execution”); Gardner, 234 P.3d at 1143 (invoking the prospect of “endless 
delay”).  
 113 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Knight, 528 U.S. 
at 992 (“[Reviewing courts might give] short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate 
claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment right suggested by Justice 
Breyer.”). 
 114 McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467; accord Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in 
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 7 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004) 
(characterizing prisoners’ efforts to challenge their sentence as “diminishing the 
severity of their sentence by endlessly postponing the day of reckoning”). 
 115 Newton, Justice Kennedy, supra note 5, at 979-80. 
 116 See id. at 980. 
 117 See id. at 991 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hall v. Florida, 134 
S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882_6kh7.pdf). Newton suggested that 
Justice Kennedy’s questioning is significant for two reasons: 
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Justice Kennedy “may be on the brink of joining Justice Breyer and 
former Justice Stevens” in supporting Lackey claims and urging the 
full Court to address the issue.118 
Second, in July 2014, Jones v. Chappell119 became the first federal 
court decision recognizing a Lackey claim. The district court in Jones 
held that execution following nineteen years on death row violated the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
for two reasons.120 First, because of systemic inordinate delay, so few 
death row prisoners will actually be executed (as opposed to dying of 
old age or other causes while on death row) as to make execution 
unconstitutionally arbitrary.121 Second, delays are sufficiently lengthy 
“that the death penalty is deprived of any deterrent or retributive effect 
it might once have had.”122 
C. The Trio of Principal Arguments Against Lackey Claims 
This section presents each of the three principal arguments against 
Lackey claims more expansively. It identifies the origin of each 
argument, traces their subsequent use, reveals the breadth of their 
adoption by Justice Thomas and the lower courts, and briefly notes 
their criticisms. 
1. Prisoner Choice and Fault 
The principal argument used to deny Lackey claims is that prisoners 
choose to pursue appellate and collateral review of their sentence.123 
 
First, they did not appear to be off the cuff. In the oral argument of a case in 
which certiorari had been granted on a legal issue that had nothing to do 
with Lackey, Justice Kennedy clearly had prepared for his Lackey-related 
questions because he cited an arcane statistic about the average delay before 
executions in the past ten Florida cases. Second, his repeated question about 
“the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve” certainly appears 
to allude to the primary arguments made by Justices Stevens and Breyer in 
addressing Lackey claims since 1995. 
Id. at 992.  
 118 Id. at 980. 
 119 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).  
 120 Id. at 1053.  
 121 Id. at 1062-63.  
 122 Id. at 1063.  
 123 See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 75, at 1090 (“For many jurists, attribution of 
fault [between the prisoner and the State for the delay] is critical to resolving [the 
Lackey claim].”); id. at 1099 (referring to the attribution of fault for the delay as “the 
heart of the matter”); see also supra note 14. 
  
862 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:843 
The consequence of that choice — delay — is therefore attributable to 
the prisoners, not the State. First, this section examines the first case 
to advance the argument and considers all subsequent pre-Lackey 
cases. Second, it presents Justice Thomas’ articulations of the 
argument. Third, it surveys post-Lackey state and lower federal courts’ 
formulations of the argument. This section concludes with an analysis 
of the gradations of disagreement with the argument. 
a. Pre-Lackey Precedent 
Chessman v. Dickson in 1960 is perhaps the first case to utter a 
version of the prisoner fault argument: “I do not see how we can offer 
life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the 
processes for a given number of years.”124 Citing Chessman, the court 
in Richmond v. Ricketts, in 1986, explained that a twelve-year delay 
failed to violate the Eighth Amendment because it “was prompted by 
Richmond’s request . . . to have his challenges . . . heard by several 
courts.”125 Affirming Richmond in 1992, the Ninth Circuit supported 
its use of the prisoner fault argument by offering Chessman and 
Andrews v. Shulsen as “relevant, though not controlling, 
precedents.”126 The court explained that the Andrews “court reasoned 
that to accept the petitioner’s argument would be ‘a mockery of justice’ 
given that the delay was attributable more to the petitioner’s actions 
[of challenging his death sentence] than to the state’s.”127 Decided 
shortly before Lackey, in 1995, the Seventh Circuit in Free v. Peters 
denied a Lackey claim because “any inordinate delay in the execution 
of Free’s sentence is directly attributable to his own conduct.”128 
b. Justice Thomas’ Articulations of the Argument 
Justice Thomas emphasized prisoners’ choice of and fault for 
execution delays in all four of his concurrences to the denial of 
 
 124 Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). A subsequent case 
interprets this proposition as “distinguish[ing] between innocent delays and delays 
caused by a defendant’s dilatory tactics.” Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 
1995).  
 125 Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986). For a brief 
discussion of Chessman, see text accompanying notes 79–80.  
 126 Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 127 Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984)). The 
prisoner in Andrews did not make a Lackey claim, but instead argued that the repeated 
setting and staying of execution dates violated the Eighth Amendment. See Andrews v. 
Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984). 
 128 Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995).  
  
2016] Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions 863 
certiorari of Lackey claims. In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas 
referred to the prisoner as “avail[ing] himself of the panoply of 
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain[ing] when his 
execution is delayed.”129 In Foster v. Florida, Justice Thomas observed 
that the “[p]etitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and 
uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have 
deemed him to deserve: execution.”130 In Thompson v. McNeil, Justice 
Thomas stressed that the “petitioner chose to challenge his death 
sentence”131 and quoted from a Fourth Circuit concurring opinion: 
“[i]t makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . for a convicted 
murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has 
secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then 
claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence 
unconstitutional.’”132 Finally, in Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Thomas 
reiterated the above statement from Knight.133 
c. Post-Lackey Precedent 
Perhaps the most influential American case deciding a Lackey claim 
is McKenzie v. Day.134 In denying the prisoner’s claim that execution 
following a twenty-year delay violates the Eighth Amendment, 
McKenzie stated that “[t]he delay has been caused by the fact that 
McKenzie has availed himself of [opportunities to challenge his 
sentence].”135 McKenzie emphasized that delay is the choice of the 
prisoner: 
A number of death row inmates have refused to avail 
themselves of avenues of review precisely to avoid this ordeal 
[of decades on death row]. This option is available to anyone 
sentenced to die, and to the extent petitioners choose to delay 
execution in the hope of obtaining relief, that is a choice they 
make for themselves.136 
 
 129 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999). 
 130 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari)) (internal citation omitted). 
 131 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009). 
 132 Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).  
 133 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1071 (2009).  
 134 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 135 Id. at 1466-67.  
 136 Id. at 1470 n.21.  
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Numerous other federal circuit court cases have denied Lackey claims 
by invoking the prisoner choice argument,137 as well as federal district 
court cases138 and state cases.139 
d. Criticisms 
The gradations of disagreement with the prisoner choice argument, 
from narrowest to broadest, are as follows. First, prisoners should not 
 
 137 See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 957 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(distinguishing the prisoner’s claim from other cases where “much of the delay had 
been due to the State’s own errors”); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (“Delay has come about because Chambers . . . has contested the 
judgments against him.”); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(“White has had the choice of seeking further review . . . or avoiding further delay of 
his execution by not petitioning for further review . . . .”); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 
1025, 1028 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause Appellant chose to avail himself of stays 
to pursue these avenues of review, they may not be used to support an Eighth 
Amendment claim.”); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Fearance 
was not the unwilling victim of a Bleak House-like procedural system hopelessly 
bogged down; at every turn, he . . . sought extensions of time, hearings and 
reconsiderations.”); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (1995) (“The delay of which he 
[the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy 
. . . .”); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We note that 
Porter has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have been 
attributable to negligence or deliberate action of the state.”).  
 138 See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *38 n.21 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the prisoner’s 
claim] . . . especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.”); 
Hairston v. Paskett, No. CV-00-303-S-BLW, 2008 WL 3874614, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 
15, 2008) (“[P]rolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not offend the 
Eighth Amendment, particularly when the delay results from prisoners[’] unsuccessful 
pursuit of collateral relief and not from the State’s dilatory tactics.”); United States ex 
rel Delvecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 95C6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 17, 1995) (“Petitioner has extended the time . . . of his execution and therefore, 
any additional punishment caused by the delay is attributable to the petitioner.”).  
 139 See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (“[D]efendant’s 
claim that the state is solely responsible for the delays in this case is inaccurate.”); 
People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (“Defendant, however, does not — and 
in good faith cannot — allege even the slightest undue delay by the state in this 
case.”); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011) (“Valle ‘cannot now contend that 
his punishment has been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his 
sentence is in large part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction[s] and 
sentence.’” (quoting Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008))); Bieghler 
v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“[T]he time between his conviction and the 
approaching execution flows from his having availed himself of the appeals process.”); 
State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 486 (Tenn. 2002) (“As in most cases, the delay in the 
instant case was caused in large part by numerous appeals and collateral attacks 
lodged by the Appellant.”).  
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be responsible for intentional delays by the State.140 Second, prisoners 
should not be responsible for delays caused by automatic, mandated 
appeals.141 Third, prisoners should not be responsible for delays 
incurred because of negligence by the State.142 Some courts denying 
Lackey claims imply disagreement with the prisoner choice argument 
to this limited extent but inevitably fail to find appreciable delays from 
these sources.143 Fourth, prisoners should not be responsible for 
delays stemming from discretionary, but successful post-conviction 
review revealing the State’s employment of constitutionally defective 
procedures.144 Fifth, prisoners should not be responsible for delays 
due to discretionary and unsuccessful review that was nonetheless 
legitimate and non-frivolous. This appears to be the position of Justice 
Stevens145 as well as most supporters of the Lackey claim,146 but it has 
 
 140 See, e.g., Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570 (“[T]here is no evidence . . . that the State 
has deliberately sought . . . to prolong the time before it could secure a valid 
conviction and execute him.”); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (“[T]he State of Montana 
has [not] set up a scheme to prolong the period of incarceration . . . .”).  
 141 See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying Lackey 
claim based on distinguishing between delays incurred during prisoner’s mandatory 
and discretionary appeals).  
 142 See, e.g., White, 79 F.3d at 439 (“[Prisoner] does not offer any evidence that 
Texas’ delay in considering his petition was . . . negligent.”); Porter, 49 F.3d at 1485 
(“We note that [the prisoner] has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his 
case have been attributable to negligence . . . of the state.”).  
 143 See cases cited supra notes 140 and 142.  
 144 See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“[The prisoner] has experienced that [twenty-three year] 
delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous 
appeals on his own part.”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1291 (Mont. 1996) 
(Leapheart, J., concurring) (rejecting prisoner fault argument where prisoner has been 
successful in appeals because “the blame properly rests with the State or the courts”). 
 145 In Lackey, Justice Stevens acknowledged that some types of prisoner 
responsibility for delay was arguably relevant. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 
(1995) (respecting denial of certiorari) (“There may well be constitutional significance 
to the reasons for the various delays that have occurred in petitioner’s case.” 
(emphasis added)). He noted that: 
“It may be appropriate to distinguish” among the following three reasons for 
delay: 
“(a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by . . . repetitive, 
frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to 
review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the State. Thus, 
though English cases indicate that the prisoner should not be held 
responsible for delays occurring in the latter two categories, it is at least 
arguable that some portion of the time that has elapsed since this 
petitioner was first sentenced to death in 1978 should be excluded from 
the calculus.” 
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been unpersuasive to nearly all courts.147 Sixth, the prisoner choice 
argument lacks a convincing rationale explaining its relevance.148 
Seventh, reflecting the broadest disagreement, prisoner choice is 
irrelevant149 because the years of death row incarceration suffered by 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Perhaps Justice Stevens conceded that at 
least some types of prisoner fault “may” be and “arguabl[y]” is relevant, in order to 
acknowledge an important English case decided shortly before Lackey (Pratt v. Att’y 
Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.)). Pratt generally 
found delay the responsibility of the State. Id. at 33 (“[F]ault is to be attributed to the 
appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who takes advantage 
of it.”). But as to “frivolous and time wasting resort to legal procedures which amount 
to an abuse of process[,] the defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of the 
delay.” Id. at 29-30. In his subsequent memorandums respecting denial of certiorari of 
Lackey claims, Justice Stevens did stress that the prisoners were not at fault, or not 
entirely at fault, for the delays. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 
(2009) (“[Petitioner] bears little, if any, responsibility for this delay.”). 
 146 See, e.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., 
dissenting) (rejecting prisoner fault argument and noting that nearly all Lackey claims 
are non-frivolous); Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing 
and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22 
(1998) (“[D]efective [state] processing systems are the true cause of most of the delay 
in capital cases.”); Newton, Slow Wheels, supra note 3, at 64 (“[T]he delays occasioned 
by such discretionary appeals, at least non-frivolous ones, should not be attributed to 
inmates who pursue such appeals.”); Jeremy Root, Note, Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
281, 299 (2001–2002) (“Frivolous petitions account for an infinitesimal fraction of 
the typical period of delay . . . .”).  
 147 The lone federal case to recognize a Lackey claim, Jones v. Chappell, rejected the 
prisoner fault argument on empirical grounds, “find[ing] that much of the delay in 
California’s postconviction review process is created by the State itself, not by inmates’ 
own interminable efforts to delay.” Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 
(C.D. Cal. 2014).  
 148 See Russell L. Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively 
Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2015) (contending that the 
argument lacks an explicit rationale and that neither of its possible rationales — 
analogizing to attribution of fault in the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right context 
and waiver of the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment — 
are persuasive). 
 149 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 37, at 105-06 (“[I]t should not matter whether the 
inmate was the partial cause of his own delayed execution. The justice system does 
not allow inmates the right to starve themselves or to otherwise engage in self-harm. 
Prisoners should similarly be barred from punishing themselves with additional time 
on death row.”); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s Refusal 
to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (“[D]elay of execution, regardless of 
who is responsible and whether it is intentional or inadvertent . . . giv[es] rise to a 
claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer’s view of the prisoner fault argument is not 
entirely clear. In individual cases he has maintained that delay was the fault of the 
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prisoners is the same regardless of whether the State or the prisoner is 
responsible.150 
2. Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness 
In addition to the prisoner choice argument, many courts reject 
Lackey claims on the basis that lengthy post-conviction review is 
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness.151 Implicit in this argument is 
the conclusion that because accuracy and fairness are constitutionally 
valuable, any consequence of that pursuit of accuracy and fairness must 
be constitutionally acceptable. Delay between sentencing and execution 
is such a consequence. Therefore, such delay must be constitutionally 
acceptable. In short, accuracy trumps speed.152 
Federal courts’ invocation of this argument perhaps began with the 
District Court of Arizona in 1986 in Richmond v. Ricketts.153 Ricketts 
rejected that a twelve-year-delay constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment because “it is better to take the time to consider each 
issue [presented by the prisoner] thoroughly rather than quickly 
dispatching someone to the gas chamber.”154 Echoing this theme of 
delays stemming from the quest for accuracy and fairness, the Ninth 
 
State and not the defendant. See infra note 236 and accompanying text. While he 
never explicitly states that prisoner fault is irrelevant, Justice Breyer comes close: “one 
cannot realistically expect a defendant condemned to death to refrain from fighting for 
his life by seeking to use whatever procedures the law allows.” Valle v. Florida, 132 S. 
Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay).  
 150 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“The State, of course, does not purposely impose the lengthy waiting 
period . . . . The impact upon the individual is not the less severe on that account.”); 
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 895 (Cal. 1972) (“An appellant’s insistence on 
receiving the benefits of appellate review . . . does not render the lengthy period of 
impending execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty from constitutional 
proscription.”); Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 
1980) (“[T]hat the delay may be due to the defendant’s insistence on exercising his 
appellate rights does not mitigate the severity of the impact on the condemned 
individual . . . from inhuman treatment.”); Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 
(1983) 2 S.C.R. 348, 353 (India) (“We think that the cause of the delay is immaterial 
when the sentence is death. Be the cause for the delay, the time necessary for 
appeal . . . or some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it 
would not alter the dehumanising character of the delay.”).  
 151 See, e.g., Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“[C]ourts often rely on two 
justifications for rejecting the [Lackey claim]: first . . . delay is reasonably related 
to . . . safeguard[ing] the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring the accuracy of 
[the] death . . . sentence . . . .”); see also supra note 14. 
 152 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
 153 640 F. Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1986).  
 154 Id. at 803. 
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Circuit, in McKenzie v. Day, contended that “[t]he delay has been 
caused by the fact that McKenzie [the prisoner] has availed himself of 
procedures our law provides to make sure that executions are carried 
out only in appropriate circumstances.”155 The court in McKenzie 
explained that “most of these procedural safeguards have been 
imposed by the Supreme Court in recognition of the fact that the 
common law practice of imposing swift and certain executions could 
result in arbitrariness and error in carrying out the death penalty.”156 
The Sixth Circuit, in Chambers v. Bowersox, similarly declared that 
“delay, in large part, is a function of the desire of our courts, state and 
federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, 
any argument that might save someone’s life.”157 In White v. Johnson, 
the Fifth Circuit rejected a Lackey claim based on a seventeen-year 
delay because the prisoner’s “claim demands that capital punishment 
be carried out quickly in spite of the importance of thorough 
factfinding in capital cases and the state’s compelling interest in 
ensuring that it does not execute innocent defendants.”158 Perhaps the 
last federal circuit case to emphasize this argument, Thompson v. 
Secretary for the Department of Corrections, denied a thirty-one year 
stay on death row as violating the Eighth Amendment by quoting 
approvingly the above language from Chambers.159 
State courts rejecting Lackey claims also invoke this argument. The 
Supreme Court of Montana quoted approvingly McKenzie’s argument 
that “the cause for the delay . . . [was that the prisoner] ‘availed 
himself of procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are 
carried out only in appropriate circumstances.’”160 The Supreme Court 
of Nebraska quoted approvingly the identical language from 
McKenzie.161 The Supreme Court of Illinois quoted approvingly the 
 
 155 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 156 Id. at 1467. 
 157 Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 158 White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); accord id. at 440 (“On the 
merits, these claims would likewise fail because the delay that White complains of 
arises from post-conviction proceedings which exist to protect White and which 
White, himself, requested when he petitioned for habeas relief.”). 
 159 Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“[D]eath row delays do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay 
results from the ‘desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . 
any argument that might save someone’s life.’” (quoting Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570)). 
 160 State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d 
at 1466-67).  
 161 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999). 
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above language from Chambers.162 The Indiana Supreme Court in 
Moore v. State, agreed with the reasoning of the above Nebraska 
decision163 and concluded that “[t]o ensure the just administration of 
the death penalty the value of speed should not trump the value of 
accuracy.”164 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected a 
Lackey claim by maintaining that “[t]he value of speed should not 
trump the value of accuracy.”165 
3. Post-Conviction Review Necessary Under Eighth Amendment 
The third principal argument used to reject Lackey claims is that 
delays that are a consequence of compliance with the Eighth 
Amendment or other constitutional mandates cannot be 
unconstitutional.166 The clearest and most concise statement of this 
argument167 is from McKenzie v. Day,168 the first Ninth Circuit post-
Lackey decision. McKenzie noted that the twenty-year delay “is a 
consequence of our evolving standards of decency, which prompt us 
to provide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest 
their convictions and sentences.”169 Because evolving standards of 
decency are a measure of the constitutionality of capital punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment,170 McKenzie is, in effect, declaring that 
delay is a product of satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In rejecting the 
prisoner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the court stated, 
“We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth 
Amendment themselves violate it.”171 
Other federal circuit courts have made similar arguments. In White 
v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the prisoner’s Lackey claim 
 
 162 People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000). 
 163 See Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002). 
 164 Id. at 55. 
 165 State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011). For criticism of this argument, 
see infra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.  
 166 See, e.g., Karl S. Myers, Comment, Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding 
Execution After a Long Stay on Death Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v. Texas, 106 
DICK. L. REV. 647, 661 (2002) (“[T]here are several fundamental reasons why . . . courts 
have rejected Lackey claims: . . . upholding the claim would result in an inconsistency 
with other Eighth Amendment requirements . . . .”); see also supra note 14. 
 167 For Justice Thomas’ articulation of a version of this argument, see infra note 232.  
 168 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lackey claim).  
 169 Id. at 1467. 
 170 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring that punishment which 
does not satisfy “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society” may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).  
 171 McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. 
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involving seventeen years on death row because “there are compelling 
justifications for the delay between conviction and the execution of a 
death sentence. The state . . . [has an] interest in insuring that those 
who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally mandated 
safeguards.”172 Two other circuit courts quoted approvingly White’s 
argument that such delays stem from compliance with 
“‘constitutionally mandated safeguards.’”173 
State courts have also utilized the argument in rejecting Lackey 
claims. In a decision predating McKenzie, the California Supreme 
Court held that “[t]he existence of an automatic appeal under state 
law [that caused significant delay and prolonged the prisoner’s stay on 
death row] is not a constitutional defect; it is a constitutional 
safeguard.”174 That is, delays caused by constitutional safeguards 
cannot be a constitutional defect. Citing McKenzie and White, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that “the very nature of capital 
litigation . . . suggests that delay . . . is the product of evolving 
standards of decency.”175 Also finding the reasoning of McKenzie and 
White persuasive, another California Supreme decision declared that 
“the delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate 
it.”176 The Supreme Court of Nebraska advanced this even more 
forcefully: “It would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays 
caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.”177 
Because this argument and the previous argument (delay is a 
consequence of post-conviction review that is necessary for accuracy 
and fairness) are so similar, their criticisms tend to run together. The 
central criticism is that prisoners have two independent rights — the 
right to review their sentences and the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment — neither of which satisfies or precludes the other.178 
 
 172 White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 173 Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439). 
 174 People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (en banc). 
 175 Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998). 
 176 People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 262-63 (Cal. 1998). 
 177 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).  
 178 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., 
concurring) (“I see no simple answer to the conundrum which results from the 
conflict between a defendant’s right to due process and appellate review and his right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.”); DAVID PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY 84 (1982) (“[A] death sentence becomes unconstitutionally cruel 
unless carried out within a reasonable time . . . and without the incidental 
infringement of any of the other rights (such as the right to appeal against conviction 
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Justice Brennan was perhaps the first to voice this criticism: “The right 
not to be subjected to inhuman treatment [prolonged death row 
incarceration] cannot, of course, be played off against the right to 
pursue due process of law.”179 That is, prisoners have the right to both 
speed and accuracy.180 Courts denying Lackey claims have ignored 
these criticisms, however, maintaining that prisoners must choose 
between speed and accuracy.181 The next Part shows that the trio is 
unsound in a way that is not so easily ignored. 
II. THE TRIO ABSURDLY DENIES CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
This Part demonstrates that the trio would deny numerous clearly 
existing constitutional rights; by generating such absurd 
consequences, the trio is unsound.182 Understanding the following 
 
and sentence) guaranteed by due process.”); Newton, Slow Wheels, supra note 3, at 64 
(“[I]t is axiomatic in our legal system that a person should not have to waive one 
constitutional right in order to exercise another.”); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A 
Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes 
Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 218 (1999) (“Requiring a prisoner to 
forgo either the right to appeal his sentence or an Eighth Amendment claim 
[unconstitutionally] forces the prisoner to choose the protection of one constitutional 
guarantee over another.”); Root, supra note 146, at 326 (“To suggest that a citizen 
loses the protection of the Eighth Amendment because he chooses to pursue appellate 
review of his capital sentence seems highly improper.”).  
 179 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
accord Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) 
(“[T]he right to pursue due process of law must not be set off against the right to be 
free from inhuman treatment.”).  
 180 See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting 
that a prisoner must choose between speed and accuracy); Rapaport, supra note 75, at 
1126-27 (“[T]he proper way to frame the Eighth Amendment debate is not as a choice 
between dispatch and delay . . . .”).  
 181 See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and 
uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to 
deserve: execution.” (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari))).  
 182 The reductio ad absurdum method of argument may informally be explained as 
follows: 
The technique is particularly powerful because it allows us, for the purpose 
of argument, to grant for a moment what our opponent believes. We say, 
‘Let’s suppose you are right. What would be the consequences?’ If we can 
then show the consequences are absurd, we can force the opponent to admit 
something is wrong in his or her position: ‘If you believe X, you must believe 
Y. Yet Y is absurd. So, do you really believe X?’ 
BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 117-18. For the most recent use of the reductio ad 
absurdum method of proof in a Supreme Court opinion, see Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 
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underlying structure of the trio helps to see how the trio could 
absurdly deny clearly existing constitutional rights: If X is (i) chosen 
by the defendant/prisoner, (ii) necessary for accuracy and fairness, and 
(iii) necessary to satisfy the Constitution, then any consequence of X 
is necessarily constitutional. The trio would therefore deny any 
constitutional right Y that is violated by the consequences of X. So for 
any two constitutional rights, X and Y, in which the consequences of 
exercising X violate Y, the trio would deny constitutional right Y. 
For an example, as discussed in the Introduction,183 the Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel (X) is chosen by the 
defendant, necessary for accuracy and fairness, and necessary to satisfy 
the Constitution. As a consequence of the exercise of the right to the 
assistance of counsel, ineffectiveness of counsel is, according to the 
trio, necessarily constitutional. But there is also a Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel (Y). Because the consequences 
of exercising the right to counsel are necessarily constitutional, despite 
violating the right to the effective assistance of counsel, the trio 
absurdly denies the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of counsel. 
This Part applies the trio to six additional contexts involving 
constitutional rights that share the above X/Y structure or relationship. 
The trio absurdly denies the following long-standing, clearly existing 
constitutional rights expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court: (i) 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool representative of the 
community, (ii) the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury, (iii) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause right against the State’s discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges of prospective jurors, (iv) the Fifth Amendment right to a 
no-adverse-inference jury instruction regarding a defendant choosing 
not to testify, (v) the Fifth Amendment right against negative 
 
S. Ct. 2567, 2590 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For notable examples of its use 
by the philosophers Plato, Immanuel Kant, and St. Thomas Aquinas, see SALMON, 
supra note 19, at 31-32, 48-49. 
More informally, the reductio ad absurdum method of argument is sometimes termed 
“proving too much.” See Moti Mizrahi, On Proving Too Much, 28 ACTA ANALYTICA 353, 
355 (2013) (discussing the relationship between the two forms of argument). To 
prove too much is simply “to make an overbroad argument.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 710 (2d ed. 1995). For a recent example of its 
use in support of the constitutionality of capital punishment, see Hall v. Florida, 134 
S. Ct. 1986, 2012 n.14 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). The “proves too much” method 
of argument has also been employed by a court to deny a Lackey claim. See Fearance 
v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 183 See supra text accompanying notes 20–29.  
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comment to the jury regarding a defendant choosing not to testify, and 
(vi) the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.184 Finally, this Part 
presents and counters four possible objections to this Part’s claim that 
the trio is unsound. 
A. No Sixth Amendment Right to Representative Jury Pool 
Suppose a defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.185 Though women comprise roughly half of the population of the 
community where the trial occurs, the State’s jury-selection process 
systematically excludes women. Out of the nearly 200 persons in the 
jury pool for the defendant’s trial, none were women. After the all-
male jury convicts, the defendant appeals claiming that her right to a 
jury pool representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the 
community was violated based on the Supreme Court decision of 
Taylor v. Louisiana.186 As Taylor explained, “[t]he unmistakable 
import of this Court’s opinions, at least since 1940 . . . and not 
repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury 
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential 
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”187 The 
hypothetical appellate court denies the Taylor claim based on the 
following application, to this Sixth Amendment context, of the trio. 
First, the defendant chose trial by jury.188 As chosen by the 
defendant, a consequence of that choice — a non-representative jury 
pool — is attributable to the defendant, not the State.189 It makes a 
 
 184 It might seem like overkill to demonstrate that the trio absurdly denies seven 
clearly existing constitutional rights, rather than just a few. But it is important to show 
the extent of the trio’s conflict with existing constitutional rights. As discussed in an 
anticipated objection to this Part’s claim, see infra Part II.G.2, the greater the extent of 
this conflict the more difficult it is for proponents of the trio to argue that the trio is 
right and the Supreme Court was wrong in recognizing constitutional rights 
conflicting with the trio.  
 185 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a . . . trial, by . . . jury . . . .”). Duncan v. Louisiana extended this right to 
defendants in state courts. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because 
we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme 
of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in 
all criminal cases which — were they to be tried in a federal court — would come 
within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”).  
 186 419 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1975) (holding that systematically excluding women 
from the jury pool violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool 
reflecting a fair-cross section of the community).  
 187 Id. at 528 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).  
 188 Compare statement in text, with supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 189 Compare statement in text, with supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the right to 
a jury trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to complain that 
the non-representativeness of the jury pool renders her conviction 
unconstitutional.190 Second, the right to a jury trial is necessary for 
accuracy and fairness.191 A consequence of what is necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness — a non-representative jury pool — must be 
constitutionally permissible.192 Providing a jury trial cannot result in a 
Sixth Amendment violation because it stems from the desire of our 
courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance that 
might prevent a wrongful conviction.193 Third, supplying a jury trial is 
necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.194 It would be a mockery of 
justice for a non-representative jury pool caused by satisfying the Sixth 
Amendment to violate it.195 
The trio denies the Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool 
representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the community. 
The trio did not deny the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim because 
she did receive a representative jury pool. Nor did the trio deny the 
claim because the defendant failed to meet her evidentiary burden in 
proving non-representativeness. Nor did the trio deny her claim 
because of some defendant-specific reason that she lacked the Sixth 
Amendment right. Rather, the trio establishes that no defendant has a 
right to a representative jury pool. 
But, of course, all defendants do have a Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury pool representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the 
community. In affirming this right, the Supreme Court in Taylor (on 
facts almost identical to this hypothetical) held “that the fair cross-
section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women, 
who in the judicial district involved here amounted to 53% of the 
citizens eligible for jury service. . . . [If women] are systematically 
eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section 
requirement cannot be satisfied.”196 By denying a clearly existing Sixth 
Amendment right, the trio leads to an absurd or false conclusion. By 
leading to an absurd or false conclusion, the trio is unsound. 
 
 190 Compare statement in text, with supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 191 Compare statement in text, with supra note 9 and accompanying text. For the 
Supreme Court’s view that jury trials are necessary for accuracy and fairness, see 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  
 192 Compare statement in text, with supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 193 Compare statement in text, with supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 194 Compare statement in text, with supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 195 Compare statement in text, with supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 196 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). 
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B. No Sixth/Fourteenth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury 
Suppose a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.197 During voir dire, a prospective juror reveals his bias and 
partiality by declaring that he would vote for the death penalty 
without regard to mitigating evidence presented at the capital 
sentencing hearing. The defendant exercises a “for cause” challenge 
requesting the prospective juror’s exclusion from serving on the jury. 
The trial court refuses and empanels the biased prospective juror on 
the jury. After the jury convicts and imposes a death sentence, the 
defendant appeals claiming a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury.198 
The hypothetical appellate court denies the claim based on the 
following application, to this Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
context, of the trio.199 First, the defendant chose trial by jury. As 
chosen by the defendant, a consequence of that choice — a biased jury 
— is attributable to the defendant, not the State. It makes a mockery 
of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the right to a jury 
trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to complain that the 
partiality of the jury renders his conviction unconstitutional. Second, 
the right to a jury trial is necessary for accuracy and fairness. A 
consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — a 
biased jury — must be constitutionally permissible. Providing a trial 
by jury cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because it stems 
from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to 
furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful conviction. 
Third, supplying a trial by jury is necessary to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for a biased jury caused 
by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate it. 
The trio denies the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury. But, of course, all defendants do have a constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. The literal text of the Sixth Amendment 
provides this right and the Supreme Court has construed the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to independently supply 
 
 197 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 198 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 
726 (1992) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause itself independently 
[from the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury] required the impartiality of any 
jury . . . .”); id. at 727 (“[D]ue process alone has long demanded that . . . the jury must 
stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment.”).  
 199 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and 
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.  
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this right.200 In Morgan v. Illinois, on similar facts as the above 
hypothetical, the Court held that defendants do have a right to an 
impartial jury under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.201 By absurdly denying a clearly existing Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right, the trio is unsound. 
C. No Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Right Against 
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges 
Suppose a defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.202 During voir dire, the prosecutor employs all of her peremptory 
challenges to exclude African-Americans from serving on the jury. The 
defendant objects but the trial court overrules the defendant’s 
objection, insisting that peremptory challenges may be used to exclude 
anyone for any reason. After the all-white jury convicts, the defendant 
appeals claiming that her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause right203 against the prosecution’s use of race-based peremptory 
challenges was violated based on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Batson v. Kentucky.204 As Batson explained, “[m]ore than a century 
ago, the Court decided that the State denies a black defendant equal 
protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from 
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”205 
The hypothetical appellate court denies the defendant’s claim based 
on the following application, to this Fourteenth Amendment context, 
of the trio.206 First, the defendant chose trial by jury. As chosen by the 
defendant, a consequence of that choice — racial discrimination in 
jury selection — is attributable to the defendant, not the State. It 
makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the 
right to a jury trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to 
complain that the discriminatory practices in jury selection renders 
 
 200 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 201 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (“A juror who will automatically vote for the death 
penalty in every case [violates] . . . the requirement of impartiality embodied in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 202 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 203 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 204 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their 
race . . . .”).  
 205 Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880)).  
 206 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and 
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C. 
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her conviction unconstitutional. Second, the right to a jury trial is 
necessary for accuracy and fairness. A consequence of what is 
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — racial discrimination in 
jury selection — must be constitutionally permissible. Providing a trial 
by jury cannot result in a Fourteenth Amendment violation because it 
stems from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to 
furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful conviction. 
Third, supplying a trial by jury is necessary to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for racial discrimination 
in jury selection caused by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate 
the Constitution. 
The trio denies the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
right against the prosecution’s use of race-based peremptory 
challenges. But, of course, all defendants do have this Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause right. The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this right in Swain v. Alabama in 1965207 and held in Batson 
in 1986 (on facts similar to that of the hypothetical) that a 
prosecutor’s use of race-based peremptory challenges violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause.208 By absurdly 
denying a clearly existing Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause right, the trio is unsound. 
D. No Fifth Amendment Right to a No-Adverse-Inference Jury 
Instruction Regarding Defendant’s Silence 
Suppose a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right, choosing 
not to testify in his defense.209 The defendant requests that the trial 
court instruct the jury not to draw a negative inference from his failure 
to testify. The trial court refuses. After the defendant is convicted, the 
defendant appeals claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment 
 
 207 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965) (“[A] State’s purposeful or 
deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the 
administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause. . . . And [this principle] 
has been consistently and repeatedly applied in many cases coming before this 
Court.”). 
 208 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (“[P]etitioner made a timely objection to the 
prosecutor’s removal of all black persons on the venire. Because the trial court flatly 
rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his 
action, we remand this case for further proceedings.”).  
 209 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).  
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privilege against self-incrimination based on the Supreme Court 
decision of Carter v. Kentucky.210 
The hypothetical appellate court denies his claim by the following 
application, to this Fifth Amendment context, of the trio.211 First, the 
defendant chose not to testify. As chosen by the defendant, a 
consequence of that choice — a court’s refusal to issue a no-adverse-
inference jury instruction — is attributable to the defendant, not the 
State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to 
choose to take advantage of the right not to testify and, after that right 
is granted, then to complain that a court’s refusal to issue a no-
adverse-inference jury instruction renders his conviction 
unconstitutional. Second, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness.212 A 
consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — a 
court’s refusal to issue a no-adverse-inference jury instruction — must 
be constitutionally permissible. Providing the opportunity for a 
defendant not to testify cannot result in a Fifth Amendment violation 
because the right against self-incrimination stems from the desire of 
our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance 
that might prevent a wrongful conviction. Third, allowing defendants 
to not testify in their own defense is necessary to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for a court’s refusal to 
issue a no-adverse-inference jury instruction that is caused by 
satisfying the Fifth Amendment to violate it. 
The trio denies the Fifth Amendment right to a no-adverse-inference 
jury instruction. But, of course, all defendants do have this Fifth 
Amendment right. As the Court held in Carter, “the Fifth Amendment 
requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ 
jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”213 By 
 
 210 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (“The principles enunciated in 
our cases construing this privilege [against compelled self-incrimination], against both 
statutory and constitutional backdrops, lead unmistakably to the conclusion that the 
Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-
inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”).  
 211 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and 
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C. 
 212 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (“It is not every one who can 
safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent . . . . Excessive timidity, 
nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious 
character . . . will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase 
rather than remove prejudices against him.” (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 
U.S. 60, 66 (1893)). 
 213 Carter, 450 U.S. at 300.  
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absurdly denying a clearly existing Fifth Amendment right, the trio is 
unsound. 
E. No Fifth Amendment Right Against Negative Comments to Jury 
Regarding Defendant’s Silence 
Suppose a defendant invokes her Fifth Amendment right, choosing 
not to testify in her defense.214 The prosecution negatively comments 
to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence. After the defendant is 
convicted, the defendant appeals claiming a violation of her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based on the Supreme 
Court decision of Griffin v. California.215 
The hypothetical appellate court denies the claim by the following 
application, to this Fifth Amendment context, of the trio.216 First, the 
defendant chose not to testify. As chosen by the defendant, a 
consequence of that choice — the prosecution negatively commenting 
to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence — is attributable to the 
defendant, not the State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice 
for a defendant to choose to take advantage of the right not to testify 
and, after that right is granted, then to complain that the prosecution 
negatively commenting to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence 
renders her conviction unconstitutional. Second, allowing defendants 
not to testify is necessary for accuracy and fairness. A consequence of 
what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — the prosecution 
negatively commenting to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence — 
must be constitutionally permissible. Providing the opportunity for a 
defendant not to testify cannot result in a Fifth Amendment violation 
because the right against self-incrimination stems from the desire of 
our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance 
that might prevent a wrongful conviction. Third, allowing defendants 
not to testify is necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment. It would be 
a mockery of justice for the prosecution’s negative comment to the 
jury regarding the defendant’s silence caused by satisfying the Fifth 
Amendment to violate it. 
The trio denies the Fifth Amendment right against the prosecution 
negatively commenting to the jury regarding a defendant’s silence. 
 
 214 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613 (holding that a court or prosecutor making negative 
comments to the jury concerning the defendant’s silence violates the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination).  
 216 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and 
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C. 
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But, of course, all defendants do have this Fifth Amendment right. As 
the Court in Griffin held, “the Fifth Amendment, in its direct 
application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States 
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by 
the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court 
that such silence is evidence of guilt.”217 By absurdly denying a clearly 
existing Fifth Amendment right, the trio is unsound. 
F. No Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial 
Suppose an indigent defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right 
to the appointment of counsel.218 Because of both numerous delays by 
the trial court and limited resources within the Public Defender’s 
office, the defendant is not assigned counsel until three years later. 
The delay in the appointment of counsel results in his trial not 
commencing until more than three years after his indictment.219 The 
defendant asserts a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation.220 
Assessments of claims of speedy trial right violations are conducted 
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s balancing test in Barker v. Wingo 
involving the following four factors: “Length of delay, the reason for 
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant.”221 Delays of about one year are generally considered 
presumptively prejudicial.222 The trial court denies the defendant’s 
claim and the defendant is convicted. The defendant appeals, claiming 
a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation. 
 
 217 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.  
 218 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 219 Cf. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining 
that convicted capital offenders are entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel for 
their automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court but must wait “on average, 
between three and five years — until counsel is appointed to represent them”); Judge 
Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
697, 721 (2007) (citing an average delay in California of over three years for the 
appointment of counsel for the automatic appeal); Scott W. Howe, Can California Save 
Its Death Sentences? Will Californians Save the Expense?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1451, 
1464 (2012) (noting a wait of “‘8 to 10 years’ from sentencing for counsel to be 
appointed for state habeas”).  
 220 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”).  
 221 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  
 222 E.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (“Depending on the 
nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay 
‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”).  
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Rather than applying the Barker four-factor balancing test, the 
hypothetical appellate court denies his claim by the following 
application, to this Sixth Amendment context, of the trio.223 First, the 
defendant chose to have appointed counsel. As chosen by the 
defendant, a consequence of that choice — delay in the 
commencement of the trial — is attributable to the defendant, not to 
the State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant 
to request the appointment of counsel at State expense and, after that 
counsel is furnished, then to complain that the very provision of that 
counsel delayed his trial and violated his constitutional rights. Second, 
the appointment of counsel for indigents is necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness. A consequence of what is necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness — delay in the commencement of the trial — 
must be constitutionally permissible. The appointment of counsel 
cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because appointment of 
counsel stems from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it 
right, to furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful 
conviction. Third, the appointment of counsel for indigents (charged 
with a felony) is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. It would 
be a mockery of justice for a delay caused by satisfying the Sixth 
Amendment to violate it. 
The trio establishes that no indigent defendant exercising the Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel also has a Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial. But, of course, all defendants, even those 
invoking the right to appointed counsel, have a Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial.224 The Supreme Court affirmed this right as 
early as 1905,225 established the modern test for assessing claims of 
violation of the right in Barker in 1972,226 and found that a defendant’s 
speedy trial right was violated in Doggett v. United States in 1992.227 
Moreover, the Court, in its latest decision on the speedy trial right, 
 
 223 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and 
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.  
 224 The defendant in Barker had appointed counsel. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 516. 
The defendant in the most recent Supreme Court case recognizing the Sixth 
Amendment right to speedy trial also had appointed counsel. See Vermont v. Brillon, 
556 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2009). 
 225 See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1905) (“Undoubtedly a defendant is 
entitled to a speedy trial . . . .”).  
 226 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (establishing a four-factor “balancing test [that] 
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis”).  
 227 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 (“When the Government’s negligence thus causes delay 
six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review . . . the defendant 
is entitled to relief [for a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause].”). 
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declared that delays stemming from the exercise of the right to 
appointed counsel can lead to a speedy trial right violation.228 By 
absurdly denying a clearly existing Sixth Amendment right, the trio is 
unsound. 
G. Objections 
This section anticipates and replies to four possible objections to 
this Part’s claim that the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions and 
is therefore unsound. First, as applied to some contexts, the trio does 
not lead to absurd or false conclusions. Second, that the trio leads to 
absurd conclusions does not make the trio unsound. Third, while 
delay is a necessary consequence of post-conviction review, the seven 
constitutional rights the trio would absurdly deny involve only 
possible consequences. And fourth, the trio is inapplicable outside the 
context of delayed executions. 
1. The Trio Sometimes Does Not Lead to Absurd or False 
Conclusions 
One might object that the trio sometimes does correctly deny 
recognition of non-existent constitutional rights. For example, 
suppose a defendant exercises her Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation229 with the consequence that her self-representation is 
ineffective. She appeals her conviction claiming that her Sixth 
Amendment right to effective representation was violated.230 The trio 
would establish that a self-representing defendant has no Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. But this time the 
trio gets it right. Self-representing defendants do not have a Sixth 
Amendment right to effective representation.231 As a result, the trio 
does not always lead to absurd or false conclusions. 
 
 228 See Vermont, 556 U.S. at 85 (“The State may be charged with [delays that] 
resulted from the trial court’s failure to appoint . . . counsel with dispatch. Similarly, 
the State may bear responsibility if there is ‘a breakdown in the public defender 
system.’” (quoting Brillon v. Vermont, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008))).  
 229 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975) (“The Framers selected in 
the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-
representation.”).  
 230 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
 231 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (noting that “a defendant who elects to 
represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense 
amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel’”). 
  
2016] Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions 883 
Though the objection is correct, it does not undermine this Part’s 
claim that the trio absurdly denies clearly existing constitutional 
rights. It merely shows that the trio does not do so in every possible 
context. That the trio does not absurdly deny clearly existing 
constitutional rights in every context does not negate that the trio does 
so in some contexts. By doing so in some contexts simply means that 
the trio does absurdly deny clearly existing constitutional rights and is 
unsound. 
2. The Trio Entails Absurd Consequences, but Is Not Unsound 
One might object that the trio absurdly denying clearly existing 
rights expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court fails to establish the 
trio as unsound. The trio is right and the Supreme Court is simply 
wrong. The trio correctly denies those seven constitutional rights that 
the Supreme Court has incorrectly guaranteed. The conflict between 
the trio and the Supreme Court does not necessarily establish the trio 
as unsound, but merely forces a choice: accept the absurd 
consequences or reject the trio. Proponents of the trio are free to 
choose to accept the absurd consequences. 
Even if true, the objection is not plausible. Consider the extent of 
the absurd consequences that proponents of the trio would be forced 
to accept. They would be forced to maintain that not just one or even 
several constitutional rights do not exist, but that seven long-standing, 
fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court 
do not exist. Moreover, they would be forced to maintain that not only 
was the Supreme Court wrong, but also the literal text of the 
Constitution was wrong in granting some of these rights. As a 
practical matter, how does a lower court denying a Lackey claim in 
reliance on the trio repudiate seven Supreme Court rulings? Even the 
Supreme Court, if and when it addresses a Lackey claim, would have 
difficulty under principles of stare decisis in overruling seven, long-
standing Court precedents (ranging across multiple constitutional 
amendments) in order to assert the trio. 
3. Delay as a Necessary Consequence 
One might object that delay between sentencing and execution is a 
necessary, not merely possible, consequence of the post-conviction 
review process necessary for satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In 
contrast, many of the contexts in which the trio absurdly denies 
clearly existing constitutional rights do not involve necessary 
consequences. For example, ineffectiveness of counsel is a possible, 
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but not necessary, consequence of exercising the right to counsel. 
Non-representative jury pools, biased juries, and discrimination in 
jury selection are possible, but not necessary, consequences of 
exercising the right to a jury trial. While the objection is true, it fails 
to gain any traction. 
Courts denying Lackey claims generally carefully avoid terming the 
delay a necessary consequence of post-conviction review.232 Rather, 
they argue that post-conviction review is necessary for both accuracy 
and fairness as well as for satisfying the Eighth Amendment.233 While 
some delay may be a necessary consequence of post-conviction review, 
the entirety of the delay might well be unnecessary and avoidable.234 A 
court denying a Lackey claim on the ground that some delay was a 
necessary and unavoidable consequence of post-conviction review 
would leave itself no basis to deny a claim where the entirety of the 
delay was unnecessary and avoidable. For example, how could the 
entirety of twenty-five year average delays in California and Florida be 
necessary and unavoidable given the national average of nearly sixteen 
years?235 Consider a more specific example. Death row prisoner Joe 
Smith’s thirty-year delay stemmed in part from two different 
 
 232 See supra Part I.C.2–3. Even the atypical references to delay as a necessary 
consequence are not clearly claiming that the entirety of the delay was necessary and 
unavoidable. See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) 
(“The existence of delays in appellant’s case have arguably been necessary to ensure 
that his conviction and sentence are proper and not inhumane.” (emphasis added)). 
Note that the court caveats its claim by use of the term “arguably.” Justice Thomas 
also refers to delay as a necessary consequence. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Consistency would seem to 
demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept 
the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary consequence.”). 
Two considerations should be noted. First, Justice Thomas fails to clearly state that 
the entirety of a delay in a Lackey claim is a necessary consequence. Second, Justice 
Thomas’ statement is conditioned on, and only applies to, those who “accept our 
death penalty jurisprudence as a given.” It does not apply to a Lackey claimant who 
need not accept that. Rather, his statement is directed to Justices generally opposed to 
the death penalty that have insisted on the extensive post-conviction review process in 
order for capital punishment to be constitutional.  
 233 See supra Part I.C.2–3.  
 234 See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(maintaining that excessive delays are “reasonably necessary [neither] to the fair 
administration of justice” nor “to protect an inmate’s rights”); People v. Simms, 736 
N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (“I am unpersuaded by the 
suggestion that United States courts must tolerate greater delays than the courts of 
Europe because the American judicial system is more concerned with addressing 
meritorious claims and achieving correct results.”).  
 235 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
  
2016] Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions 885 
“constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings.”236 Just as 
ineffectiveness of counsel and biased juries are neither necessary nor 
unavoidable, so also multiple constitutionally defective sentencing 
hearings are neither necessary nor unavoidable. A court denying 
Smith’s Lackey claim thus could not argue that the entirety of the 
thirty-year delay was a necessary and unavoidable consequence of 
post-conviction review. Similarly, for capital offenders, the average 
delays in California of three to five years for the appointment of 
counsel for direct appeal and eight to ten years for the appointment of 
state habeas counsel are hardly necessary and unavoidable.237 As a 
result, while some delay may be a necessary consequence, particularly 
lengthy delay — excessive delay — is only a possible consequence. 
Therefore, just as ineffectiveness of counsel and biased juries are 
possible (not necessary) consequences, so also excessive delay is 
merely a possible (not a necessary) consequence. For these very 
reasons courts generally do not claim that the delay objected to by the 
prisoner was a necessary consequence of post-conviction review. 
4. The Trio Is Inapplicable Outside the Context of Delayed 
Executions 
Perhaps the most likely objection is that the trio is inapplicable and 
unfairly applied outside the context of delayed executions. The 
objection is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the three 
arguments are not deeply embedded in an Eighth Amendment-specific 
framework. Not only is there little about them relevant only to the 
Eighth Amendment, but also there is little about them relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment at all. Consider how little these arguments have to 
say about the central concerns of the Eighth Amendment cruel and 
unusual punishment clause — punishment, proportionality, the 
penological purposes of retribution and deterrence, and evolving 
standards of decency. Numerous commentators and judges have 
criticized the courts denying Lackey claims for failing to engage in any 
substantive Eighth Amendment analysis.238 To the three arguments a 
 
 236 Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). See also, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that much of the twenty-seven year 
delay stemmed from “the State’s repeated procedural errors”); Elledge v. Florida, 525 
U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calculating that 
“18 of the 23 years of delay” resulted from “the State’s own faulty procedures”).  
 237 See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1066.  
 238 See, e.g., Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting) (“We have always found a way to avoid addressing Lackey claims on the 
  
886 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:843 
fair response is to ask even if they are true, so what? What do they 
have to do with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment? Where is the analysis demonstrating that 
execution following as much as thirty years or more of death row 
incarceration is not cruel and unusual punishment?239 The trio fails to 
even address whether decades of death row incarceration is or is not 
punishment. The trio may hardly be defended as Eighth Amendment-
specific (and thus not subject to application to other constitutional 
contexts) while simultaneously hiding from any substantive Eighth 
Amendment analysis. 
Second, it is perhaps because the courts denying Lackey claims 
strategically wish to avoid substantive Eighth Amendment analysis 
that these arguments are stated as broad propositions about 
constitutional law and constitutional rights. They are meant to appeal 
to our intuitions, common sense, and sense of reason. For example, 
the following broadly framed statements used by courts to deny 
 
merits . . . . We are out of excuses.”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1489 (9th Cir. 
1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority ignores the relevant ‘penological 
justification’ analysis . . . . In fact, the majority evaluates the merits of McKenzie’s 
Eighth Amendment claim without engaging in any legal analysis whatsoever.”); Jones, 
31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“When courts have rejected [Lackey claims] . . . they have 
often not addressed whether any penological purpose of the death penalty continues 
to be served more than two decades after the death sentence was imposed.”); Aarons, 
supra note 146, at 42 (“[C]ourts have generally refused to consider the merits of the 
[Lackey claim] argument . . . .”); Rapaport, supra note 75, at 1126 (noting that courts 
typically fail “[t]o meet Lackey proponents on the ground on which they are 
arguing”); Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 648, 650 (2000) (“[T]he . . . majority failed 
to address adequately [the prisoner’s] constitutional claims. The majority never 
refuted the argument that excessive delays constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment . . . .”); Root, supra note 146, at 310 (“Justice Thomas’ treatment of the 
[Lackey] claim has pragmatic appeal, but he did not undertake a genuine assessment 
of the question of delay . . . .”); Kara Sharkey, Comment, Delay in Considering the 
Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth 
Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 886 (2013) (“[P]rocedural issues dispose of a 
number of Lackey claims without consideration of the claim’s substantive 
arguments.”); Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of 
Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1596-97 (2013) (“Courts often avoid the [Lackey] claim by 
imposing procedural obstacles, or reject it based on precedent that itself provides little 
explanation . . . [or exploit] its procedural complexity to avoid reaching the 
substantive issues.”).  
 239 Cf. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“Instead [of substantive 
analysis], the majority substitutes a policy lecture . . . [on disruptions to] ‘the orderly 
administration of the death penalty’ . . . . But what does this have to do with whether 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment will be violated if 
McKenzie is executed after . . . [decades] on death row?”). 
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Lackey claims hardly seem to be limited to Lackey claims and the 
Eighth Amendment: “The value of speed should not trump the value 
of accuracy.”240 “[The petitioner] ‘has benefitted from this careful and 
meticulous process and cannot now complain that the expensive and 
laborious process of habeas corpus appeals which exists to protect him 
has violated other of his rights.’”241 “‘[I]t would indeed be a mockery 
of justice if the delay incurred during the prosecution of claims that 
fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the 
very relief that had been sought and properly denied in the first 
place.’”242 “A defendant must not be penalized for pursuing his 
constitutional rights, but he should also not be able to benefit from the 
ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights.”243 All of the above 
statements are broadly framed and not specific to Lackey claims or 
even the Eighth Amendment. By being so broadly framed, and 
arguably purposefully broadly framed, it is fair game to apply the three 
arguments as broadly as they are framed. 
Third, some aspects of the three arguments are themselves based on 
other constitutional contexts. Consider the following argument: 
“‘Having sought the aid of the judicial process and realizing the 
deliberateness that a court employs in reaching a decision, the 
defendants are not now able to criticize the very process which they so 
frequently called upon.’”244 This could easily be an argument asserted 
by Justice Thomas in one of his concurrences to the denial of 
certiorari of Lackey claim petitions.245 Or it could easily be an 
argument asserted by a court denying a Lackey claim.246 But it is 
 
 240 State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011). 
 241 Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 242 Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McKenzie, 57 
F.3d at 1466). 
 243 Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 244 United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316-17 (1986) (quoting United 
States v. Auerbach, 420 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1969)).  
 245 Compare statement in text accompanying note 244, with Knight v. Florida, 528 
U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“I am unaware 
of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for 
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and 
collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”). 
 246 Compare statement in text accompanying note 244, with Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 
924, 933 (1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (“It is a mockery of our system of justice . . . 
for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay and 
systemic abuse has secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to 
then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence 
unconstitutional.”), and Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1143 (Utah 2010) 
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neither. It is an argument used to reject a Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial right violation claim.247 Consider as well the following argument: 
“Virtually all of the delays of which the petitioner complains occurred 
in the course of appellate proceedings and resulted either from the 
actions of the petitioner or from the need to assure careful review of 
an unusually complex case.”248 This argument as well could easily be 
from Justice Thomas or a court denying a Lackey claim. Instead, it is 
from the Supreme Court decision of Harrison v. United States denying 
a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation claim.249 Note that the 
Harrison argument is essentially the first two arguments of the trio. 
That is, the delays cannot be unconstitutional because they result from 
(i) the actions of the petitioner, not the State, and (ii) the necessity of 
ensuring that the outcome is accurate and fair. Moreover, several 
courts have explicitly relied on the Harrison argument in denying 
Lackey claims.250 If aspects of the three arguments themselves look to 
the analysis of constitutional rights outside the Eighth Amendment, 
one can hardly maintain that the trio is limited to the narrow context 
of the Eighth Amendment and Lackey claims. At the very least, the 
three arguments may fairly be applied to the very context from which 
they borrow — the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. Ironically, as 
Part II.F demonstrated, the three arguments deny the very right from 
which they borrow — the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. There 
could be no better demonstration that the three arguments are 
 
(“[B]ecause executions are delayed as a result of a petitioner’s decision to invoke legal 
process, it is incongruous to hold that the time consumed by that process makes the 
petitioner’s sentence unconstitutional.”). 
 247 Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 317 (“We cannot hold, on the facts before us, that the 
delays asserted by respondents weigh sufficiently in support of their speedy trial claim 
to violate the Speedy Trial Clause.”). 
 248 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 221 n.4 (1968). 
 249 See id. (“The petitioner’s further contention that he was denied the right to a 
speedy trial is wholly without merit and was properly rejected by the Court of 
Appeals.”). 
 250 See Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1991) (denying Lackey 
claim based on, and by citing to, Harrison, 392 U.S. at 221 n.4); Richmond v. Ricketts, 
640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (same); People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal. 
1998) (same). As a result, not only do courts denying Lackey claims rely on cases 
addressing Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation claims, but the very 
arguments courts use to deny Lackey claims are nearly identical with and may be 
derived from arguments used to reject speedy trial right violation claims. Therefore, 
arguments nearly identical to and derived from the analysis of other constitutional 
rights may fairly be applied to other constitutional rights, especially those rights from 
which they borrow.  
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unsound than their denial of the very constitutional right from which 
they draw support. 
III. WHY THE TRIO IS UNSOUND 
Part II demonstrated that the three arguments, individually and 
collectively, are unsound. Applying the arguments to a wide variety of 
constitutional claims revealed them to lead to absurd or false 
conclusions. They denied numerous clearly existing constitutional 
rights. By leading to absurd or false conclusions, the arguments 
themselves are unsound. While that more than suffices as a basis to 
reject them, it still might be helpful to understand why they are 
unsound. This might especially be helpful given these arguments have 
enjoyed enormous influence in persuading courts to reject Lackey 
claims. For nearly twenty years nearly every court addressing a Lackey 
claim invoked them, and not a single court disagreed with them.251 
How could arguments that have been so persuasive be unsound? 
Part III explains both why the arguments seem so intuitively 
appealing and why they are unsound. It identifies the flaw in each of 
the three arguments. The flaw in the first argument — a defendant/
prisoner is responsible for the consequences of the constitutional 
rights she chooses to exercise — is the false assumption that the 
defendant/prisoner is ultimately responsible for the type of trial the 
State conducts and the type of punishment the State imposes. The flaw 
in the second and third arguments — the consequences of what is 
necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfying the Constitution cannot 
violate it — is the false assumption that what is necessary to satisfy the 
Constitution is also sufficient. The identification of these false 
assumptions provides an additional basis, independent from Part II, 
for rejecting the trio. 
A. Prisoner Choice and Fault 
The underlying structure of the first argument is that if a defendant/
prisoner chooses X, then the defendant/prisoner, not the State, is 
responsible for the consequences of X. With the defendant/prisoner 
responsible for those consequences, those consequences do not 
constitute a State violation of the defendant/prisoner’s constitutional 
rights. As applied to the Lackey claim context, prisoners choose 
appellate and collateral review with the consequences of delayed 
execution and prolonged death row incarceration. Prisoners are 
 
 251 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.  
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responsible for the consequences of their choices. Therefore, lengthy 
delay and prolonged pre-execution incarceration cannot constitute a 
State violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights. Both in the abstract 
and as applied to the delayed execution context, the argument is 
facially plausible if not persuasive. The argument appeals to our 
intuitions. The argument is essentially stating that persons should be 
responsible for the consequences of their choices. Who could disagree 
with that? The argument also draws on some parallels with such 
homespun wisdom as “you made your bed, now lie in it,” “as you reap 
you shall sow,” “take the good with the bad,” “in for a penny in for a 
pound,” and “with choices comes responsibility.” 
But constitutional law simply does not follow such conventional 
wisdom. As seen in Part II, that defendants choose to exercise 
constitutional rights does not preclude consequences of those choices 
from being unconstitutional. Defendants choosing the assistance of 
appointed counsel may have the consequences of ineffective assistance 
of counsel252 and delayed trials.253 Despite these being consequences of 
defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional. Defendants 
choosing jury trials may have the consequences of jury pools 
unrepresentative of the community,254 biased juries,255 or prospective 
jurors excluded for race-based reasons.256 Despite these being 
consequences of defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional. 
Defendants choosing not to testify may have the consequences of 
courts refusing to instruct juries not to draw negative inferences 
regarding defendants’ silence257 and prosecutors inviting juries to draw 
such negative inferences.258 Despite these being consequences of 
defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional. Despite the 
intuitive appeal of holding defendants responsible for the 
consequences of their choices, the above examples demonstrate that 
constitutional law often holds the State responsible for the 
consequences of defendants’ choices. 
Moreover, constitutional law may hold the State responsible for the 
consequences of defendants’ choices even in the arguable absence of 
any State action. For example in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the ineffectiveness of privately retained (not State-
 
 252 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23. 
 253 See supra Part II.F. 
 254 See supra Part II.A. 
 255 See supra Part II.B. 
 256 See supra Part II.C. 
 257 See supra Part II.D. 
 258 See supra Part II.E. 
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appointed) counsel constituted a Sixth Amendment violation of the 
defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel.259 Not only did the 
defendant choose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel, but 
also the defendant chose his counsel. If the consequence of those 
choices by the defendant was the ineffectiveness of counsel, how could 
the State be responsible when seemingly it was not the State’s fault? 
The State seemingly did nothing to contribute to the ineffectiveness of 
counsel. The state of Pennsylvania made this very argument: 
ineffectiveness of “retained counsel does not involve state action” and 
thus cannot be the basis for a constitutional violation.260 In ruling that 
defendants have the constitutional right to effective assistance of even 
privately retained counsel,261 the Court explained that “[t]his Court’s 
decisions establish that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated 
and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”262 Cuyler further explained 
that “[w]hen a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial 
[a trial in which the defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel], it 
is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his 
liberty.”263 Thus, it is the State that is prosecuting the defendant, and it 
is the State that has the ultimate constitutional duty and responsibility 
to provide the defendant with a fair trial, which includes the effective 
assistance of counsel.264 As a result, the State, not defendants, may be 
responsible for the consequences of defendants’ choices even in the 
arguable absence of any State action. The State has the ultimate 
constitutional duty to conduct a fair trial. 
Just as with trials, the State is also ultimately constitutionally 
responsible for the nature of the punishment it imposes and the 
manner of its imposition.265 For example, suppose one chooses to 
 
 259 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“[W]e must decide whether the 
failure of retained counsel to provide adequate representation can render a trial so 
fundamentally unfair as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 
 260 Id. at 342. 
 261 See id. at 344 (“A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms [the State’s] 
contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection 
than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel.”). 
 262 Id. at 343 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941); Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923)).  
 263 Id. at 343. 
 264 See id. at 344 (“[T]he State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the 
State in the defendant’s conviction . . .”). 
 265 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons.”); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes to 
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commit a crime. A possible consequence of that choice is punishment 
for the commission of the crime. That punishment is a consequence of 
the defendant’s choice does not preclude that the nature of the 
punishment or manner of its imposition might violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Why? The State is ultimately responsible for the type of 
punishment and manner of its imposition. Despite the crime being the 
defendant’s choice, the punishment being a consequence of that 
choice, and the State not at fault for or the cause of the defendant’s 
choice to commit the crime, the State has the ultimate constitutional 
responsibility and duty to not impose cruel and unusual punishment. 
Consider another example. Suppose a death row prisoner 
intentionally consumes illegal drugs, ingests toxic substances, or 
sustains a head injury in an attempt to become insane with the 
purpose of delaying or permanently preventing execution. The 
prisoner succeeds and is pronounced insane. Not only did the prisoner 
choose to commit a capital crime, with the consequence of the risk of 
capital punishment, but also the prisoner chose to harm himself with 
the consequence of the risk of insanity. The prisoner is the sole cause 
of and at fault for everything — the commission of the crime, the 
punishment, and the insanity. Surely the State can constitutionally 
execute the prisoner? It cannot. As the Supreme Court in Ford v. 
Wainwright held, “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from 
carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”266 
Executing an insane person constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.267 Affirmed by the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman,268 Ford 
announced a categorical bar against executing the insane.269 That a 
 
authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply 
its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death 
penalty.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic 
worth as human beings.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. 
While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this 
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”); Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005) 
(“The purpose of the Eighth Amendment ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ 
however, is to place constraints on the ways in which we pursue [the penological 
purposes of punishment].”).  
 266 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).  
 267 See id. 
 268 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (noting the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
executing the insane (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10)). 
 269 See, e.g., Jonathan Greenberg, Note, For Every Action There Is a Reaction: The 
Procedural Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229 
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person is insane is sufficient to trigger the bar, how or why the person 
is insane is irrelevant.270 Therefore, despite all of the prisoner’s choices 
and fault for the consequences of those choices, the State has the 
ultimate responsibility not to impose cruel and unusual punishment. 
That the insanity was a consequence (even intended) of the prisoner’s 
choices does not preclude imposition of capital punishment on this 
prisoner from being unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.271 
Similarly, that a death row prisoner chooses appellate and collateral 
review, with the (perhaps even intended) consequences of excessively 
delaying execution and prolonging pre-execution incarceration does 
not necessarily preclude execution following as much as thirty years 
or more of death row incarceration from being unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual punishment. No matter what a prisoner chooses, 
causes or intends, the State has the ultimate constitutional 
responsibility of not imposing cruel and unusual punishment. As a 
result, the flaw of the prisoner choice argument is the false assumption 
that death row prisoners are necessarily responsible for the 
consequences of their choices, the type of punishment the State 
imposes, and the manner of its imposition. 
Interestingly, in addition to the State, the Supreme Court may bear 
responsibility. Three justices supportive of the death penalty have 
assigned blame to the Court itself for delays between sentencing and 
execution. Objecting to a delay of eight years, former Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist stated, “I do not think that this Court can continue 
to evade some responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice 
system.”272 Referring to the average delays of nearly twenty-five years 
in Florida, Justice Antonin Scalia admitted that “most of the delay has 
 
(2012) (“Ford . . . establish[ed] a categorical exclusion shielding [insane] defendants 
from capital punishment . . .”). 
 270 The State, however, may be permitted to take measures to restore the prisoner 
to sanity. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A State 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Ford when it executes a 
prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who 
subsequently regained competency through appropriate medical care.”).  
 271 For another example, suppose a juvenile whose age makes him ineligible for 
capital punishment lies about his age claiming that he is above the age of capital 
punishment eligibility. Despite the juvenile choosing to make himself eligible for the 
death penalty and being responsible for the consequences of that choice, executing the 
juvenile would nonetheless constitute a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (imposing a 
categorical bar on execution of persons under the age of eighteen).  
 272 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
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been because of rules that we have imposed.”273 Even Justice Thomas 
conceded that “in most cases raising this novel [Lackey] claim, the 
delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this Court’s 
Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”274 Whether excessive delay is 
claimed to be the fault of the State, the Court, or the prisoner, 
execution following excessively prolonged death row incarceration is 
no more or less a constitutional violation; it is no more or less a cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
B. Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness 
The underlying structure of the second argument is that if X is 
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness, then any consequence of X 
must be constitutionally permissible. In the delayed execution context, 
appellate and collateral review is necessary to ensure accurate and fair 
death sentences. Consequences of that review are delay between 
sentencing and execution and prolongation of the pre-execution death 
row incarceration. Therefore, delay and prolongation of the death row 
incarceration must be constitutionally permissible. In short, in a 
hierarchy of constitutional values, speed should not trump accuracy. 
Both in the abstract and as applied to the delayed execution context, 
the argument seems facially plausible and perhaps even persuasive. 
But applying the argument to other contexts helps reveal its flaws. 
As seen in Part II, that the exercise of some right is necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness does not preclude a consequence of the exercise 
of that right from violating another constitutional right. The right to 
counsel is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict.275 
Exercising the right may have the consequences of ineffective 
assistance of counsel276 and delayed trials.277 That these consequences 
stem from what is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict 
makes them no less unconstitutional. The right to a jury trial is 
necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict.278 Exercising the right 
may have the consequences of jury pools unrepresentative of the 
 
 273 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-
10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
12-10882_6kh7.pdf. 
 274 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari).  
 275 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 276 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23. 
 277 See supra Part II.F. 
 278 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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community,279 biased juries,280 and prospective jurors excluded for 
race-based reasons.281 That these consequences stem from what is 
necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict makes them no less 
unconstitutional. The right not to testify is necessary to ensure an 
accurate and fair verdict.282 Exercising the right may have the 
consequences of courts refusing to instruct juries not to draw negative 
inferences regarding defendants’ silence283 and prosecutors inviting 
juries to draw such inferences.284 That these consequences stem from 
what is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict makes them no 
less unconstitutional. 
The flaw in this second argument rests on the necessary/sufficient 
distinction.285 The second argument conflates what is necessary for 
accuracy and fairness with what is sufficient to satisfy the 
Constitution. The second argument assumes that what is necessary to 
ensure accuracy and fairness is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution.286 
 
 279 See supra Part II.A. 
 280 See supra Part II.B. 
 281 See supra Part II.C. 
 282 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 283 See supra Part II.D.  
 284 See supra Part II.E.  
 285 See, e.g., BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 158 (“Sufficient conditions are what 
is enough for something to be the case. Necessary conditions are what is required for 
something to be the case.”); Boruch A. Brody, Glossary of Logical Terms, in 5 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 57, 60 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (“A necessary condition is 
a circumstance in whose absence a given event could not occur or a given thing could 
not exist. A sufficient condition is a circumstance such that whenever it exists a given 
event occurs or a given thing exists.”). “Confusion may result if the 
[necessary/sufficient] distinction is not heeded.” SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 73 (1st ed. 1996). A condition may be necessary without 
being sufficient. For example, being able to lift at least 50 pounds is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for being able to lift 100 pounds. Conversely, a condition may be 
sufficient without being necessary. For example, being able to simultaneously lift two 
items that weigh 50 pounds each is a sufficient condition for being able to lift 100 
pounds but is not a necessary condition when there are other ways of being able to lift 
100 pounds — for example, by being able to simultaneously lift one item weighing 75 
pounds and another item weighing 25 pounds. A single condition may be both 
necessary and sufficient. For example, “[b]eing composed of H2O is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for something being water.” BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 159. 
And some conditions may be individually necessary and jointly sufficient. For example, 
“to be ice, a substance must both be H2O and at [a freezing temperature].” Id. 
 286 Cf. Recent Cases, supra note 238, at 650-51 (“The court [denying the Lackey 
claim] failed to acknowledge the possibility that extensive post-trial procedures could 
be both necessary and cruel — necessary because they satisfy a constitutional 
mandate, and cruel because they generate delays prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
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If that assumption were true, the second argument would be sound.287 
But that assumption is false. As demonstrated in Part II, the exercise of 
many different constitutional rights may be necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness but are not individually sufficient to satisfy the 
Constitution. As a result, the consequences of that which is necessary 
to ensure accuracy and fairness sometimes do violate the Constitution. 
Because the assumption of the second argument that what is necessary 
must also be sufficient is false, the second argument is unsound.288 
C. Post-Conviction Review Necessary Under Eighth Amendment 
The underlying structure of the third argument is if X is necessary to 
satisfy the Constitution, then any consequence of X cannot violate the 
Constitution. In the delayed execution context, appellate and 
collateral review is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 
Consequences of that review are delay between sentencing and 
 
 287 If what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness is also sufficient to satisfy 
the Constitution, then any consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and 
fairness cannot violate the Constitution.  
 288 The flaw in the alternatively formulated second argument — that speed should 
not trump accuracy — rests on the implicit assumption that those represent the only 
two options. Applied to a Sixth Amendment context, see supra Part II.F, the argument 
suggests defendants have the choice of either an excessively delayed trial with counsel 
or a speedy trial without counsel. But because defendants are constitutionally entitled 
to both speed and accuracy, the assumption is false. If the State cannot provide the 
third option of both speed and accuracy, there is an available remedy: no trial and the 
indictment or charges dismissed with prejudice. There is no constitutional obligation 
that the defendant be prosecuted. Each of the first two options is unconstitutional; 
only the third option (or its remedy) is constitutional.  
Similarly, in the Lackey claim context, the argument that speed should not trump 
accuracy suggests that there are only two options. First, an expeditious execution but 
without the review that ensures execution is warranted; second, an excessively and 
unreasonably delayed execution with full review. Because that assumption that there are 
only two options is false in the Sixth Amendment context above, that assumption may 
also be false in the Lackey claim context. Just as exercise of the right to counsel does not 
preclude a speedy trial right violation, so also exercise of the right to full review of a 
capital sentence does not necessarily preclude execution following as much as thirty 
years or more of death row incarceration from being cruel and unusual punishment. 
Rather than speed trumping accuracy or accuracy trumping speed, both speed and 
accuracy may constitutionally be required. Because both are required in the above Sixth 
Amendment context, both may be required in the Lackey claim context. If the State 
cannot provide the third option of both full review and freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment there is an available remedy: reduce the capital punishment to life 
imprisonment without parole. There is no constitutional obligation that death row 
prisoners be executed. Each of the first two options may be unconstitutional; only the 
third option (or its remedy) cannot be unconstitutional. Neither speed nor accuracy 
necessarily supplants the other; rather, the right to each may supplement the other.  
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execution and prolongation of the pre-execution death row 
incarceration. As consequences of what is necessary to satisfy the 
Eighth Amendment, delay and prolongation of the death row 
incarceration cannot violate it. Both in the abstract and as applied to 
the delayed execution context, the argument seems facially plausible 
and perhaps even persuasive. 
But applying the argument to other contexts helps reveal its flaws. 
As seen in Part II, that some right is necessary to satisfy one aspect or 
part of the Constitution does not preclude a consequence of the 
exercise of that right from violating another constitutional right. The 
right to counsel is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.289 
Exercising the right may have the consequences of ineffective 
assistance of counsel290 and delayed trials.291 That these consequences 
stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution makes them no 
less unconstitutional. The right to a jury trial is necessary to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment.292 Exercising the right may have the consequences 
of jury pools unrepresentative of the community,293 biased juries,294 
and prospective jurors excluded for race-based reasons.295 That these 
consequences stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment makes them no less unconstitutional. The right not to 
testify is necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.296 Exercising the 
right may have the consequences of courts refusing to instruct juries 
not to draw negative inferences regarding defendants’ silence297 and 
prosecutors inviting juries to draw such inferences.298 That these 
consequences stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment makes them no less unconstitutional. 
Just as in the second argument, the flaw in this third argument rests 
on the necessary/sufficient distinction.299 The third argument conflates 
what is constitutionally necessary with what is constitutionally 
sufficient. The third argument assumes that what is necessary to 
 
 289 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 290 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23. 
 291 See supra Part II.F.  
 292 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 293 See supra Part II.A. 
 294 See supra Part II.B. 
 295 See supra Part II.C. 
 296 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 297 See supra Part II.D. 
 298 See supra Part II.E. 
 299 For an example of the Supreme Court’s utilization of the necessary/sufficient 
distinction, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 23 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
See also supra note 285.  
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satisfy the Constitution is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. If that 
assumption were correct, the third argument would be sound.300 But 
that assumption is false. As demonstrated in Part II, the exercise of 
many different constitutional rights may be necessary to satisfy the 
protections the Constitution affords criminal defendants but are not 
individually sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. As a result, the 
consequences of what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution 
sometimes do violate the Constitution. Because the assumption of the 
third argument that what is necessary must also be sufficient is false, 
the third argument is unsound. 
CONCLUSION 
Upholding the constitutionality of execution following as much as 
thirty years or more of post-sentence, pre-execution death row 
incarceration rests principally on a trio of arguments. This trio, 
however, leads to absurd or false conclusions. In addition to denying 
Eighth Amendment protection to Lackey claims, the trio absurdly 
denies seven clearly existing constitutional rights emanating from the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and expressly guaranteed by 
the Supreme Court. Ironically, the trio even denies the very right — 
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial — from which the trio 
draws support. By denying long-standing constitutional rights, the trio 
establishes too high a bar for a claimed constitutional right to meet. If 
seven fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme 
Court cannot meet this too-high standard, then a Lackey claim’s 
failure to meet this too-high standard is no longer evidence that it fails 
to warrant constitutional protection. Moreover, by leading to absurd 
or false conclusions — denying clearly existing constitutional rights 
— the trio is itself unsound. True, demonstrating that the primary 
support for the constitutionality of excessively delayed executions is 
unsound does not affirmatively establish the unconstitutionality of 
such executions. But eliminating the support of the trio does eliminate 
the principal obstacle to courts recognizing that execution following 
as much as thirty years or more of death row incarceration violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. It clears the path for courts to recognize Lackey claims. 
 
 300 If what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution is sufficient to satisfy the 
Constitution, then any consequence of what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution 
cannot violate it.  
